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Abstract 
This thesis explores accounting for biological assets under International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 41 – Agriculture. The study focuses on listed firms worldwide which 
comply with the criteria of having first adopted International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) before 2012. 
IAS 41 has motivated intense debate on accounting for agricultural activity, mostly 
due to introducing severe changes in measurement of biological assets: from historical 
cost to fair value. Recently, International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) settled 
adjustments in this standard, allowing firms to choose between cost or revaluation 
model concerning mature bearer plants. 
In order to provide a better understanding of IAS 41 in listed firms, a theme that has 
yet received scarce academic attention, this study aims at achieving two main 
objectives. Firstly, to identify the firm and country-level determinants that explain 
disclosure and measurement practices of biological assets. Secondly, to examine the 
value relevance of measuring those assets at fair value.  
Regarding disclosure practices, empirical results suggest that the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure level is influenced by biological assets intensity, ownership 
concentration, firm size, sector and legal status. Regarding measurement practices, 
evidence shows that fair value adoption is influenced by biological assets intensity, firm 
size, listing status, regulation expertise, potential growth, sector and legal status. 
Concerning value relevance, this research adjusts the Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995) and 
suggests that biological assets at fair value are value relevant, in particular for firms that 
show a higher disclosure level.  
This study seeks to help standard setters and firms’ stakeholders to better understand 
disclosure and measurement practices of biological assets and their determinants. 
Additionally, it intends to contribute to increased awareness about the market valuation 
implications of IAS 41 and to identify new areas of research on the issue of accounting 
for biological assets. 
 
Keywords: biological assets, disclosure index, measurement, value relevance, 
financial reporting 
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Resumo 
Esta tese explora as práticas de contabilidade dos ativos biológicos em conformidade 
com a norma International Accounting Standard (IAS) 41 – Agriculture, para empresas 
com títulos cotados, à escala mundial, com ano de adoção das normas International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) anterior a 2012. 
A norma IAS 41 tem motivado o debate da contabilidade sobre a actividade agrícola, 
dada a alteração radical que introduziu ao nível da mensuração, pela mudança de 
valorização ao custo histórico para o justo valor. Recentemente, o International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) alterou esta norma e estabeleceu que as empresas 
poderão escolher entre o modelo de custo e de revalorização para mensurar ativos 
biológicos de produção maduros, as plantas.  
Com a presente tese pretende-se atingir dois principais objetivos. Primeiro, identificar 
factores ao nível da empresa e país que expliquem as práticas de divulgação e de 
mensuração dos ativos biológicos. Segundo, explorar a relevância do justo valor na 
mensuração daqueles ativos.  
Quanto às práticas de divulgação, os resultados da presente investigação permitem 
concluir que o nível de divulgação obrigatória e voluntária é influenciado pela 
intensidade dos ativos biológicos, concentração da propriedade, dimensão da empresa, 
setor e posição legal. Quanto à adoção do justo valor a evidência empírica sugere que 
esta é influenciada pela intensidade dos ativos biológicos, dimensão da empresa, 
presença em bolsa estrangeira, experiência da regulação, crescimento potencial, setor e 
posição legal. Quanto à relevância, esta investigação ajusta o modelo de Ohlson 
(Ohlson, 1995) e os resultados sugerem que os ativos biológicos ao justo valor são 
relevantes, em particular para as empresas com um maior nível de divulgação. 
Este estudo contribui para uma melhor compreensão sobre as práticas de divulgação e 
de mensuração dos ativos biológicos e seus determinantes, que se estima ser útil para 
entidades normalizadoras e stakeholders das empresas e ambiciona conhecer as 
implicações da valorização do mercado sobre a norma IAS 41. Adicionalmente, esta tese 
identifica novas áreas de investigação sobre a contabilidade dos ativos biológicos. 
Palavras-chave: ativos biológicos, índice de divulgação, mensuração, relevância, 
relato financeiro 
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1.1. Background and motivation 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1 are a global recognised set of 
standards for financial reporting purposes, especially for preparation of financial 
statements. IFRS provide guidance on the preparation of financial information of listed 
firms that insure more than half of the world’s gross domestic product (IFRS 
Foundation, 2015). IFRS focus on three main issues, namely: transparency – supporting 
decision-making of investors; accountability – providing a comparable information 
source; and efficiency – improving capital allocation. Over one hundred countries 
require or allow the usage of IFRS for all or most domestic publicly accountable entities 
(Daske et al., 2013). 
Several potential benefits related to IFRS are supported in the literature, namely high 
quality of the standards, lower cost of capital, increased investor demand for securities 
and stock market liquidity (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Ball, 2006). However, the socio-
economic environmental differences between countries have reduced the even 
implementation of these standards and therefore their quality (Tsalavoutas et al., 2014; 
Amiraslani et al., 2013; Wysocki, 2011; Ball, 2006). Furthermore, it seems that firm-
level determinants influence the governance and incentive instruments and consequently 
affect the compliance with IFRS (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Wysocki, 2011). 
IFRS include the controversial concept of fair value. Despite that fair value is 
responsible for volatility of results and for encouraging some decision-making 
preference, it also provides more information into financial statements (Ball, 2006; Hitz, 
2007). Fair value accounting is applied to three main types of assets, namely: financial 
instruments (with easy access to market price), investment property (with feasible future 
cash flow estimate) and agriculture and embraces present value techniques (Barlev and 
Haddad, 2003). Concerning agriculture, there was a strong expectation regarding the use 
of fair value due to the existence of a highly developed future and active market for 
commodities. Conversely to financial instruments, which have an active market, every 
                                                          1 International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS) are standards issued by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The Regulation (EC) no. 1606/2002 requires that listed firms in European Union (EU) prepare their consolidated financial statements under IFRS for years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. IFRS include International Accounting Standards (hereafter IAS) and their interpretations adopted by IASB from its predecessor, International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 
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so often non-financial assets, such as investment property and biological assets, face the 
constraint of a more difficult fair value assessment (Barlev and Haddad, 2003). 
Due to the relative importance of the agricultural sector in global economy, 
accounting in this area received little attention from researchers until the 
implementation of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 41 – Agriculture (Fisher 
and Marsh, 2013; Fisher et al., 2010; Herbohn and Herbohn, 2006). Prior to 2005, for 
example, in the United Kingdom, biological assets were usually measured at historical 
cost (less accumulated depreciation and any impairment losses). Harvested agricultural 
produce was recorded as inventories and measured at the lower of cost and net 
realizable value (Cairns et al., 2011). 
IAS 41 was originally issued in December 2000 and firstly applied to annual periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 20032. This standard prescribes the accounting 
treatment for biological assets during the period of biological transformation and also 
for the initial measurement of agricultural produce at the point of harvest.  
The disclosure required by IAS 41 comprises both financial and non-financial 
information that corresponds mainly to mandatory information and also to some 
recommended information. Paragraphs [IAS 41.40-57] cover mandatory information, 
except paragraphs [IAS 41.43] and [IAS 41.51], which correspond to recommended 
information. 
Disclosure practices of accounting for biological assets seem pertinent to investigate 
due to the increased disclosure requirements brought by IAS 41 and given that this 
research topic has not been widely discussed so far.  
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that international accounting practices are 
dissimilar and, additionally, it is possible that determinants related to the country of 
origin explain the differences in accounting practices (Nobes, 2008). For example, Elad 
and Herbohn (2011) suggest that countries like Australia and the United Kingdom 
exhibit a higher disclosure level of biological assets than other countries, like France. 
The beginning of this dissertation focuses on analysing disclosure practices under 
IAS 41 with the intent to enrich the overall understanding of firms’ behaviour where 
                                                          2 There are other IFRS that have made minor consequential amendments to IAS 41. They include IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements (as revised in December 2003 and in September 2007), IAS 2 Inventories (as revised in December 2003), Improvements to IFRS (issued in May 2008) and IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement (issued in May 2011). 
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biological assets are concerned. This analysis is done through the use of worldwide 
evidence and provides an examination of the impact of specific determinants related to 
firms and countries on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of biological assets. This 
research of firms’ disclosure practices was considered an essential basis for the 
subsequent analysis of more complex issues such as measurement practices and the 
examination of the value relevance of fair value of biological assets. 
As a simple rule, IAS 41 requires biological assets to be measured on initial 
recognition and at subsequent reporting dates at fair value less costs to sell. The single 
exception allowed to fair value measurement is applied only to initial recognition and 
within a strict context: a market-determined price is not available and the entity cannot 
assure a reliable estimate of fair value [IAS 41.30]. In such conditions, the entity uses 
the unreliability clause of fair value and recognises biological assets at cost less 
depreciation and impairment. Also, agricultural produce should be measured at fair 
value less costs to sell at the point of harvest.  
Bearing in mind the mandatory requirement of IAS 41 to measure biological assets at 
fair value, to examine it as a matter of choice may seem unreasonable. Theoretically, 
followers of the unreliability clause of fair value should match the firms with no 
conditions to measure biological assets at fair value. Nonetheless, and following prior 
literature, it is likely that there are other reasons that could explain the adoption of 
historical cost, even when the clause does not apply (Elad and Herbohn, 2011; Fisher et 
al., 2010; Elad, 2004). Consequently, it could be challenging to find out firm and 
country-level determinants that could support different measurement practices. 
According to this standard, biological assets should be divided into bearer biological 
assets and consumable biological assets. In terms of market valuation implications of 
this standard, fair value assessment diverges under this classification. Rather than 
agricultural produce, bearer biological assets are self-regenerating (for example, 
livestock from which milk is produced, grape vines, fruit trees and trees from which 
firewood is harvested while the tree remains [IAS 41.44]). Usually, for this type of 
biological assets fair value is achieved differently. For example, “in case of the wine-
growing sector (…) it is difficult to find active market due to the characteristics of the 
vines and the corresponding grapes in the different regions” (Azevedo, 2007:21). 
Conversely, consumable biological assets are harvested as agricultural produce or sold 
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as biological assets (for example, livestock intended for production of meat, livestock 
held for sale, fish in farms, crops such as maize and wheat, and trees grown for lumber 
[IAS 41.44]). Frequently, there is an active market for this type of biological assets. For 
that reason, the corresponding fair value can be easily determined. 
Although there are studies that confirm that accounting information related to 
biological assets has impact on investors’ decision-making (Silva Filho et al., 2013; 
Argilés Bosh et al., 2012; Argilés et al., 2011), there are others that do not support value 
relevance in the biological assets domain (Machado et al., 2013; Martins et al., 2012).  
Hence, and given recent data, it could be motivating to infer about how accounting 
information, concerning fair value of biological assets, is reflected in share prices and 
how it influences investors’ decision-making. After analysing disclosure and 
measurement, conditions would be met to develop research on relevance of the fair 
value, as a second issue in this research. 
Moreover, and in order to enhance previous studies related to biological assets and to 
assure some synergy in the whole dissertation, it could be particularly interesting to 
analyse market valuation impact including both means of decision usefulness, 
disclosure and measurement. This issue has also a theoretical support. Regarding 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) conceptual framework for financial 
reporting, disclosure is not a replacement of recognition. In order to be recognised, an 
item must have “a cost or value that can be measured with reliability” (paragraph no. 
4.38.b), Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting). The same criteria are not 
applied for disclosed items. Nonetheless, Choudhary (2011) and Holthausen and Watts 
(2001) support that recognition suggests less reliability, considering managers are more 
encouraged to manipulate recognised items than disclosed items. 
Recently, IASB has amended IAS 41 in what it refers to bearer plants. Firstly, IASB 
issued an exposure draft in June 2013 (IFRS Foundation, 2013a) that recommended 
several amendments to accounting requirements for bearer plants, such as tea bushes, 
grape vines and oil palms. This project was developed in the context of a primary issue 
by Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), which proposed, as an alternative 
to fair value, that bearer biological assets be removed from IAS 41 and inserted in IAS 
16 – Property, plant and equipment. In this context, a bearer plant is a living plant that is 
used in the production or supply of agricultural produce and it is expected to bear 
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produce for more than one period, having remote likelihood of being sold as agricultural 
produce, except for incidental scrap sales [IAS 41.5]. The amendments take into 
consideration bearer plants (prior to reaching maturity) and its measurement at 
accumulated cost, such as self-constructed items of property, plant and equipment. 
Additionally, entities will be permitted to choose either the cost model or the 
revaluation model for mature bearer plants under IAS 16. Produce growing on bearer 
plants should be accounted for at fair value in accordance with IAS 41. These 
amendments are effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016, with 
earlier application being permitted (IFRS Foundation, 2014).  
In the beginning of 2014, within the context of this project, IASB discussed some 
issues, namely: the scope of the amendments, accounting for produce growing on bearer 
plants and guidance to apply IAS 16 to bearer plants. IASB has listened to investors, 
analysts and other users of financial statements and they all stated that fair value 
measurement under IAS 41 provides limited information. These financial users are 
concerned about the reliability of fair value measurements, with regard to management 
judgment. Specifically, information about bearer plants is not very useful without fair 
value information about related land, land improvements and agricultural machinery 
(IFRS Foundation, 2014). 
In brief, three reasons have supported this change. Firstly, fair value measurement for 
bearer plants in the absence of the corresponding market is complex, costly and implies 
practical constraints. Moreover, changes in fair value less costs to sell are recognised in 
profit or loss and imply results volatility. Secondly, mature bearer plants are assumed as 
manufacturing assets, since they are no longer undergoing significant biological 
transformation. Finally, the reported profit or loss is adjusted by financial users to 
eliminate effects of changes on fair valuation of bearer biological assets, because their 
focus is on the revenue from the produce growing of these assets. Overall, these 
adjustments are expected to reduce compliance costs, complexity and profit volatility 
for preparers, without a significant loss of information for users of their financial 
statements. They also provide relief from retrospective restatement by permitting an 
entity to use the fair value of an item of bearer plants as the deemed cost at the start of 
its earliest comparative period (IFRS Foundation, 2014). 
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In order to anticipate and also to support in some sense this change, after exploring 
disclosure at preliminary stage, it could be interesting to explore empirical essays 
regarding measurement and value relevance in the present research, taking into account 
the classification under IAS 41, namely bearer biological assets and consumable 
biological assets. In the overall, IAS 41 is far from stabilising and enhances timeliness 
and relevance of this study. 
1.2. Purposes  
Based on previous considerations regarding accounting for biological assets under 
IAS 41, this thesis embraces two main goals and the corresponding research questions.  
The first objective aims to identify the firm and country-level determinants that could 
explain mandatory and voluntary disclosure and measurement practices of biological 
assets under IAS 41 with the following research questions: 
(i) What is the disclosure level on biological assets in listed firms under IAS 41?  
(ii) What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in the 
disclosure level on biological assets among listed firms? 
(iii) What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in practices 
used to measure biological assets among listed firms? 
The second objective aims to examine the value relevance of fair value of biological 
assets under IAS 41 in order to investigate the market valuation implications of this 
standard. Therefore, the following research questions are considered in this research: 
(i) Are biological assets at fair value value relevant under IAS 41? 
(ii) Is there a difference in the value relevance of biological assets between listed 
firms with high and low disclosure level on biological assets? 
After introducing the main purposes of this dissertation, next section will briefly 
describe some considerations in respect with theoretical background. 
1.3. Theoretical background 
In a conceptual perspective, there are several theories that could explain firm-level 
determinants of disclosure practices, such as: agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and signalling theory (Morris, 1987). Additionally, firm-level determinants of 
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measurement practices could be supported by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and accounting choice theory (Fields et al., 2001; Watts, 1992; Zmijewski and 
Hagerman, 1981). Based on a transversal perspective, contingency theory supports 
country-level determinants of disclosure and measurement practices (Doupnik and 
Salter, 1995).  
Agency theory defines the incentive problems in firms motivated by the ownership 
and control separation – the principal (owner of the firm) and the agent (manager) 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this sense and where disclosure practices are 
concerned, managers are strongly motivated to disclose complete information in order 
to achieve their compensation. For example, bearing in mind larger firms, they are 
expected to have higher agency costs; therefore, these firms are also influenced to 
improve the information level to stakeholders and financial analysts. Consistent with the 
previous considerations, signalling theory is implied by positive monitoring costs in 
agency theory (Morris, 1987). Under information asymmetry, a listed firm in several 
stock exchanges that develops international trading activities has more information to 
control and consequently, is interested in signalising its position to stakeholders by 
improving disclosure. 
Considering accounting choices, the related theory comprises the firm manager’s 
choice of one accounting method over another (Watts, 1992), which corresponds in this 
study, to choose between fair value and historical cost as valuation method. Given 
market imperfections such as transaction costs and externalities, Fields et al. (2001) 
state that accounting choices are used by managers to disseminate their private 
information and to inﬂuence the beliefs of rational investors. Moreover, accounting 
choice could detect the economic determinants that move managers towards certain 
directions (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981) and could explain how these determinants 
could be changed. This would be particularly helpful for accounting regulators to 
anticipate, for example, how firms would answer to a change in accounting rules. 
In what it concerns to contingency theory and according to Doupnik and Salter 
(1995), the external environment, the institutional structure and the cultural values 
support accounting divergence between countries. The external environment comprises 
various factors, namely legal system, relationship between business and providers of 
capital, tax laws, inflation levels, political and economic ties, level of education and 
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level of economic development. For example, and transposing to the present study, the 
legal system (to belong to a code law versus a common law country) and the relation 
between tax rules and accounting (strong or weak) have an impact in the extent of 
disclosure and in fair value adoption. 
Finally, value relevance of biological assets under IAS 41 is explored under the 
theory of asymmetric information (Glaum et al., 2013; Hitz, 2007; Healy and Papelu, 
2001), which assures a strong background for the valuation purpose of financial 
reporting. Trustworthy and opportune information decreases the risk of valuation 
calculated by investors and enhances decision-making assessment (Glaum et al., 2013). 
Thus, measurement contributes to the decision usefulness objective (Hitz, 2007) and 
additionally, disclosure mitigates information asymmetries in capital markets and 
reduces the cost of capital (Glaum et al., 2013; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Nonetheless, 
financial statements are not effective in decreasing information asymmetries, if financial 
reporting is tendentiously partial and not complete (Glaum et al., 2013). 
1.4. Methodology 
This thesis explores a selection of listed firms worldwide that complies with the 
criteria of having first adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
before 2012. This research includes data from three periods of analysis in order to get 
more recent data and to maximise the number of firms to be analysed. The three periods 
correspond to both research goals: 2011, to examine disclosure practices; 2012 to study 
measurement practices; and a three-year period from 2011 to 2013 to explore the value 
relevance of biological assets under IAS 41. IFRS 1 – First-time Adoption of IFRS 
allows some exemptions and exceptions which may cause some constraints when 
analysing and making inferences about the information of the year of adoption (Callao 
Gastón et al., 2010). Consequently, 2010 should be the limit year to consider firms that 
adopted IFRS (or equivalent standards) to examine disclosure practices and explore the 
value relevance of biological assets under IAS 41. In addition, 2011 should be the limit 
year to consider firms that adopted IFRS (or equivalent standards) to study measurement 
practices. 
During the research, when data were collected in DataStream, the chosen year was 
the most recent year with more updated information, in order to assure the maximum 
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possible number of countries and consequently number of firms, as well as to provide a 
research with recent data.  
Initially, countries were selected that adopted IFRS until 2010 and 2011. Then, 
considering the corresponding selection of countries, were selected firms that have 
biological assets.  
Firstly, considering disclosure practices, the study adopts an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression model to test the relation between the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure of biological assets with firm and country-level determinants for 
the year of 2011.  
Secondly, taking in to account measurement practices, the research considers a logit 
model in order to identify the firm and country-level determinants that explain 
differences in practices used to measure biological assets for the year of 2012. After 
developing the previous cross-sectional analysis with the specific purpose of explore 
disclosure and measurement practices, the following step consists in examining the 
market valuation implications of IAS 41 for biological assets that are measured at fair 
value.  
Bearing in mind value relevance of biological assets, this study adjusts the original 
accounting-based valuation model developed by Ohlson (Ohlson, 1995) from 2011 to 
2013, considering panel data with fixed effects. 
1.5. Structure 
After presenting a brief introduction that includes the regulatory framework 
regarding IAS 41, the motivation, the main purposes, the theoretical background and the 
methodology in this first chapter, the next chapters correspond to the three essays of this 
dissertation, namely: disclosure practices, measurement practices and value relevance of 
biological assets under IAS 41. 
Chapter 2 analyses mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices of biological assets 
and their determinants of 270 listed firms worldwide that adopted IFRS until 2010. This 
essay provides a literature review of disclosure requirements of IAS 41 and of the 
country influence in firms’ reporting practices. Besides, a disclosure index of biological 
assets is constructed and calculated based on the notes to the consolidated financial 
statements included in 2011 annual report. This essay tests the relation between the 
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extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets with the firm 
and country-level determinants using an OLS regression model.  
Chapter 3 examines measurement practices of biological assets and their 
determinants, based on data from 2012 taking into consideration 324 listed firms 
worldwide that adopted IFRS until 2011. Bearing in mind the literature review, this 
study discusses measurement requirements of IAS 41 and the influence of firm and 
country-level determinants. The research model includes a binary dependent variable for 
measurement practice (fair value or historical cost) and explores several firm and 
country-level determinants that are expected to be related to the measurement of 
biological assets.  
Chapter 4 addresses the second objective of this thesis. Based on 132 listed firms 
worldwide that adopted IFRS until 2010, this essay analyses the value relevance of fair 
value regarding biological assets. The study includes the debate of fair value relevance 
under international financial reporting, and then applied to non-financial assets and 
biological assets in particular. In order to test the market valuation implications of this 
standard for biological assets measured at fair value, this study adjusts the original 
Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995) and considers panel data from 2011 to 2013. This essay 
includes also the effect of the disclosure level of biological assets. 
Finally, the dissertation ends with chapter 5 that presents the main findings, 
introduces some limitations of the study, suggests avenues for future research and states 
main contributions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Accounting for Biological Assets: 
Disclosure practices of listed firms 
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2.1. Introduction 
Bearing in mind a firm’s financial position and performance, disclosure is a way of 
sharing economic, financial or non-financial, quantitative or qualitative information. 
Considering mandatory disclosure, at a first sight, it appears incongruent to analyse it 
in terms of compliance. Furthermore, if firms are required to answer to specific 
information, ideally there would be no reason for differences to occur in disclosure 
reporting. Nonetheless, in accordance with Chavent et al. (2006), firms exercise some 
discretionary behaviour in financial reporting, where mandatory disclosures are 
concerned. Therefore, there is a close link with voluntary disclosure and both can be 
studied under the same theoretical framework. In literature, the reason why firms 
voluntarily disclose is related to several theories, namely, stakeholder theory, agency 
theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory and political economy theory (Oliveira et 
al., 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Inchausti, 1997; Cooke, 1989). 
On the topic of biological assets, before IAS 41, “current accounting principles 
typically do not respond very well to the particular characteristics of agricultural 
business and the information needs of farmers and their stakeholders” (Argilés and Slof, 
2001:361). Given this standard implementation, empirical evidence (Elad and Herbohn, 
2011) shows that, there are countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, where 
firms tend to disclose more detailed information on biological assets than firms from 
other countries, such as France. This indicates that the comparability of international 
accounting practices is missing and, in addition, it is probable that country-level 
determinants explain the differences in accounting practices (Nobes, 2008). 
Furthermore, Argilés and Slof (2001) believe that IAS 41 introduces important 
improvements, for example, definition, valuation and presentation of biological assets 
and agricultural produce with supportive classifications (mature and immature 
biological assets, consumable and bearer biological assets). They also state that the 
impact of IAS 41 is mainly on conceptual level and additional tools are required for its 
adoption. Conversely, several authors (Silva et al., 2012; Elad and Herbohn, 2011; 
Aryanto, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010; Argilés et al., 2009; Argilés Bosh, 2007; Elad, 2007 
and 2004; George, 2007) raise the controversy about the “goodness” of fair value under 
IAS 41. 
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Considering disclosure practices of biological assets as documented in previous 
literature (Elad and Herbohn, 2011), the aim of this essay is to explore the following 
research questions: 
 What is the disclosure level on biological assets in listed firms under IAS 41?  
 What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in the disclosure 
level on biological assets among listed firms? 
In order to address these questions, this study establishes several hypotheses that 
relate to the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of biological assets with firm 
and country-level determinants. An index of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets is built based on IAS 41 disclosure requirements and the recommended 
best practices by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2011) and it is calculated based on 
the notes to the consolidated financial statements included in the 2011 annual report of a 
worldwide selection composed of 270 firms from 40 IFRS adopting countries3. Bearing 
in mind previous studies, this essay provides a wider research based on a larger number 
of countries and determinants with recent data. In particular, this essay emphasizes the 
country-level determinant, by exploring two different country classifications, namely, 
the common law versus code law classification supported by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
a cluster classification that exemplifies a more current perspective (Leuz, 2010). 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a literature review, firstly 
by focusing on the debate of disclosure requirements of IAS 41, and afterwards 
discussing the country classification. Section 2.3 introduces the development of 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the methodology, presenting the selection and the 
disclosure index. Section 2.5 discusses the ﬁndings from the empirical analysis. Finally, 
the essay provides a brief conclusion. 
                                                          3 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. 
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2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. Disclosure requirements of IAS 41 
There are some studies in the literature that have assessed the implementation impact 
of IAS 41 (Elad and Herbohn, 2011; PwC, 2011 and 2009; Silva et al., 2012; Scherch et 
al., 2013; Theiss et al., 2012). Based on an international selection of firms, and in 
reference to biological assets, Elad and Herbohn (2011) and PwC (2011 and 2009) 
suggest different disclosure level and that comparability is missing. 
Elad and Herbohn (2011) have conducted a survey in order to determine perceptions 
from several users of financial information, such as valuation consultants, accountants 
and auditors of the agricultural sector in Australia, France and the United Kingdom. 
They have concluded that, as main lessons, the costs of measuring and reporting 
biological assets at fair value outweigh the benefits and that the fair value accounting 
model prescribed by IAS 41 increases earnings volatility. In addition, there is a lack of 
comparability of disclosure practices, in which French firms incline not to disclose 
complete information on biological assets. Besides, this study has developed a checklist 
of disclosures prescribed by IAS 41 and each firm was assigned a score based on the 
percentage of disclosed items. 
PwC (2011 and 2009) has elaborated two international studies concerning the impact 
of adopting IAS 41 in the timber sector. The main goal was to provide what might be 
considered establishing best practices in fair valuing of this sector and related 
disclosures. Additionally, in both studies, PwC has identified the major pronouncements 
described on the notes of financial statements, highlighting some of the main 
constraints, comparisons and dissimilarities. In general, firms have different levels of 
transparency regarding biological assets disclosure and usually they do not discuss fair 
valuation assumptions, so there is an opportunity for further improvement. PwC (2011) 
has recommended several practices in this field, namely: to present key valuation 
assumptions (for example, forest and harvest plans and the complexity of the asset’s 
structure); to discuss expected future prices and costs to better understand the valuation 
adopted; to provide a sensitivity analysis related to each weight assumption used in the 
valuation that has an effect on the value in case of a change (for example, discount rate, 
prices, costs and growth).  
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Further empirical evidence about disclosure practices relating to this standard is still 
scarce. For example, the following studies focus on Brazil. 
Silva et al. (2012) have developed a disclosure index concerning the information 
related to the agricultural sector of 45 Brazilian firms regarding the 2010 annual report. 
The disclosure of biological assets types and the reconciliation of the carrying value of 
their changes are the most frequently reported items, but other items are neglected, such 
as management risks and other restrictions of biological assets. They have concluded 
that a higher transparency level in disclosure would help to mitigate information 
asymmetry. As a consequence, stakeholders would improve their understanding of the 
biological assets’ activities.  
Regarding Brazil’s adoption of IFRS and a sample of 24 traded Brazilian firms in 
2010, Scherch et al. (2013) have concluded that, on average, there was 57% of 
conformity with Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis (CPC) 29 - Pronunciamento 
técnico - Ativo Biológico e Produto Agrícola (equivalent standard to IAS 41 in Brazil). 
Taking into account that IAS 41 is a new pronouncement, this study highlighted that 
measuring at fair value may imply several constraints to the stakeholders, including 
preparers and analysts. A large disclosure about biological assets would tend to reduce 
the uncertainty associated with biological assets reporting. In this respect, firms 
interested in improving the quality of their reporting shall increase the amount of 
informative disclosure since a considerable number of sentences is capable of enlarge 
the quality score (Hooks and Van Staden, 2011). 
Similarly, Theiss et al. (2012) have investigated the implementation of CPC 29 
guidelines of 21 Brazilian listed firms in 2010. Using a disclosure index, the results 
stated that 95% of the sample complies partially with general information on biological 
assets. The study has suggested that some of the information required is considered 
confidential by the firm administration; therefore, disclosure items were not fully 
disclosed. Consequently, the stakeholders, including auditors and regulators, should 
play an important role in analysing if the biological assets disclosure is sufficient or not.  
Hence, the present study attempts to enrich the overall understanding of disclosure 
practices of biological assets by focusing on evidence worldwide and examining the 
impact of firm and country-level determinants on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets. 
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2.2.2. Country classification  
Several studies have elected the institutional factor as the main influence for firms’ 
reporting practices (Wysocki, 2011; Nobes, 2008; Djankov et al., 2003). In fact, even 
though the aim with IFRS is to assure accounting comparability between countries, it 
does not eradicate the national, industry and firm-level institutional influences 
(Wysocki, 2011). 
Taking into consideration this seminal factor, some country’s classifications have 
been developed in the literature (Leuz, 2010; Nobes, 2008; La Porta et al., 1998).  
La Porta et al. (1998) have analysed legal rules related to shareholders and its origin 
and the quality of enforcement in 49 countries. They have divided the firms by common 
law and code law country classification. Nobes (2008) has classified countries into two 
groups, namely strong equity, commercially driven (for example, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom) and weak equity, government driven, tax-dominated (for example, 
Germany, France and Italy).  
Nowadays, there are other alternative taxonomies to the common law versus code law 
perspective, for example, cluster classification (Leuz, 2010) using regulatory and 
reporting practice variables. Leuz (2010) has suggested that outsider economies with 
large and developed stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor protection and 
strong enforcement (cluster 1) show higher disclosure scores and more informative 
earnings than insider economies with less developed stock markets, concentrated 
ownership and weak investor protection. Insider economies are divided into two 
clusters, diverging in the strength of their legal systems; as a result, those economies 
with strong enforcement (cluster 2) show higher transparency scores than the others 
(cluster 3). Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that corroborates the paradigm is 
changing. For example, Hellmann et al. (2013) have investigated if Germany is moving 
from the traditional Continental European accounting model to a middle position 
between this one and the Anglo-American accounting model, with the promulgation of 
the Act to Modernize Accounting Law (issued in May 2009). This Act assured some 
reforms to the code and to accounting principles, for example, to eliminate the straight 
liaison to tax rules and to settle new recognition and valuation rules (Hellmann et al., 
2013). Also, Callao Gastón et al. (2010) and Lewis and Salter (2006) have argued that 
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the United Kingdom should be included in the European accounting model, instead of 
being considered a common law country. 
2.3. Development of hypotheses 
Based on previous studies, this essay focuses on the following two research 
questions: 
 What is the disclosure level on biological assets in listed firms under IAS 41?  
 What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in the disclosure 
level on biological assets among listed firms? 
Conceptually, several theories can explain firm disclosure. The positive accounting 
theory supports the effort of explaining and predicting accounting practices, in this case 
related to biological assets. The main goal of positivist accounting research is to 
corroborate a specific accounting fact with related causal explanations (Luft and 
Shields, 2014; Ittner, 2014). Although the results must be reproduced by other 
researchers in an equivalent domain and reliable within their peers, usually these 
explanations have implicitly a subjective decision. In order to assure causality, there is a 
need to eliminate alternative causal explanations. According to Luft and Shields (2014), 
there are two possible ways of doing that. Firstly, by providing credible evidence 
against other possible justifications. Secondly, by narrowing the specification of context 
that reduces the number of alternative causal explanations. This essay adopts the second 
possibility, electing firm and country-level segments. 
Glaum et al. (2013) have supported that firm-level determinants are more relevant 
than country-level determinants in more advanced countries with developed markets 
and institutions. Otherwise, in less developed countries, the country-level determinants 
are more significant than firm-level determinants. Regarding the diversity of countries 
of the selected 270 listed firms worldwide, it seems advisable to investigate both 
influences. 
The research model includes a disclosure index and explores several determinants 
that are expected to be related to the disclosure level, namely, firm-level variables – 
biological assets intensity, ownership concentration, firm size, auditor type, 
internationalisation level, listing status, profitability, sector – and country-level variable 
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– legal status. As explained in the next sub-section, the selected variables are supported 
by other studies that also focus on disclosure practices. Therefore, this study aims to 
realise if the same expectations and results are obtained in the particular context of 
biological assets. 
For each independent variable, the causal mechanisms and the supporting theories are 
identified and explained as follows. 
2.3.1. Firm-level variables 
 Biological assets intensity 
Scherch et al. (2013) have stated that the disclosure level rises with the increasing 
intensity of biological assets. Considering other non-financial assets, for example 
goodwill impairment, firms have a higher propensity to disclose when they have larger 
amounts of non-financial assets (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Heitzman et al., 2010). 
Moreover, goodwill impairment requires valuation skills, so there is also a strong 
expectation that firms allocate more resources to improve quality report when they have 
a relative materiality position (Glaum et al., 2013; Shalev, 2009). Another example is 
the disclosure level of provisions, which is also related to the corresponding amount of 
provisions (Chavent et al., 2006).  
That could be the case of biological assets, given the complexity of measurement and 
disclosure requirements. Bearing in mind the stakeholder theory, Silva et al. (2012) 
have expected preparers of financial reporting of biological assets to assure the 
disclosure level regulated by IAS 41 in order to provide information to users of such 
financial statements. This statement is even more significant if firms have material 
amounts of biological assets, given the previous examples of goodwill and provisions. 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H1: There is a significant positive association between biological assets intensity and 
the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 Ownership concentration  
The firms’ reporting incentives are influenced by ownership structure (Glaum et al., 
2013; Leuz, 2010). Considering that agency problems arise because of the separation of 
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ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs increase as the 
ownership structure becomes more dispersed (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In order to 
decrease agency costs, firms with higher ownership diffusion have stronger incentives 
to provide transparent financial reporting (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
Also, IFRS are settled to assure that information is provided to shareholders, to 
decrease information asymmetry between managers and external users and to enhance 
disclosure transparency (Ding et al., 2007). For firms that are controlled by several 
investors, higher demand for public disclosure may also lead to higher incentives for 
disclosure (Daske et al., 2013).  
The above considerations indicate an expected negative sign for the relation. 
H2: There is a significant negative association between ownership concentration and 
the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 Firm size 
Some studies indicate firm size as a determinant of compliance with reporting 
standards (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Glaum et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2006). Glaum et 
al. (2013) have demonstrated that larger firms are responsible for disclose financial 
information with more quality than smaller firms, since the formers usually have more 
allocated resources to accounting divisions. Depoers (2000) has confirmed this 
argument. Furthermore, costs of increased disclosure are well supported by larger firms 
(Amiraslani et al., 2013). 
Larger firms are likely to have a higher percentage of outside capital and also 
enlarged agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); consequently, these firms are 
required to assure a more developed level of information to stakeholders, especially 
financial analysts (Depoers, 2000). 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H3: There is a significant positive association between firm size and the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 
 
21 
 
 Auditor type 
Auditing is an effective function of restraining managers’ opportunistic reporting 
conduct (Tsalavoutas, 2011). Consequently, and regarding agency theory, independent 
auditors reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983:615) have emphasised that it is possible “(…) only if the market expects the 
auditor to have a nonzero level of independence”. Committees and penalties, including 
reputation loss, are some of the incentives for auditors to assure their independence. To 
avoid reputation costs, these firms demand a higher disclosure level (Oliveira et al., 
2006; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Furthermore, prior literature explains the strength of enforcement of accounting 
standards by the existence of stronger audit firms (Hope, 2003). The larger the audit 
firm, the higher is its perceived quality (DeAngelo, 1981). Several studies have revealed 
a positive association between disclosure level and being audited by the Big 4 auditing 
firms (Glaum et al., 2013; Cascino and Gassen, 2011; Hodgdon et al., 2009). 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H4: There is a significant positive association between auditor type and the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 Internationalisation level and listing status 
The disclosure level is positively related to the degree of foreign activity in the firm 
(Daske et al., 2013; Amiraslani et al., 2013) and to the firm’s listing status (Amiraslani 
et al., 2013; Cooke, 1992). Managers of firms that operate in several geographical areas 
have to provide larger disclosure, bearing in mind the higher complexity of the firms’ 
activities (Cooke, 1989).  
Due to signalling theory, international trading activities (Oliveira et al., 2006; 
Depoers, 2000) and the presence in several stock exchanges (Oliveira et al., 2006; 
Hope, 2003) imply large and complex amounts of information to control, and 
consequently, this influences firms to express their international position to stakeholders 
by improving disclosure.  
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for both relations. 
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H5: There is a significant positive association between internationalisation level and 
the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
H6: There is a significant positive association between listing status and the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 Profitability 
Taking into consideration the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), disclosure 
controls a manager’s performance. Managers disclose detailed information in order to 
assure their compensation and position. Additionally, the signalling theory explains that, 
when the rate of return is high, firms are expected to disclose good news to prevent any 
reduction of their share value (Oliveira et al., 2006).  
Lan et al. (2013) and Chavent et al. (2006) have considered firm performance, 
measured by the return on equity, as a relevant explanatory variable for the disclosure 
level. Lang and Lundholm (1993:250) have noticed that “the results from theoretical 
and empirical research suggest disclosure could be increasing, constant, or even 
decreasing in firm performance”. As an example, in case of negative earnings 
information, firms are more likely to disclose in order to reduce the possibility of legal 
liability. 
Because of the mixed empirical evidence in prior literature, there is no strong 
expectation regarding the sign of this variable. 
H7: There is an association between profitability and the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
 Sector 
Based on the signalling theory, it is expected that firms belonging to the same sector 
are concerned with assuring the same disclosure level in order to prevent an undesirable 
assessment by the market (Oliveira et al., 2006). As a consequence, firms tend to be 
motivated to follow their corresponding sector practice (Amiraslani et al., 2013). With 
regard to the legitimacy theory, and in response to stimulating requirements of IFRS 
reporting, firms may follow common industry practices to legitimise their performance 
(Glaum et al., 2013). 
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In terms of mandatory disclosure, Rahman et al. (2002) have compared accounting 
regulations and accounting practices in Australia and New Zealand and have concluded 
that sector influences the disclosure level. In fact, “the nature of activities within an 
industry could also be a reason for the diversity in both the amount and type of 
disclosure and measurement practices among firms” (Rahman et al., 2002:53). 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation in: 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining sectors and in the manufacturing sector, as 
these are associated with biological assets.  
H8: There is a significant positive association between sector and the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
2.3.2. Country-level variable 
A country-level variable, such as legal status, “may act as a summary measure for a 
country’s approach to a number of regulatory issues and therefore could have significant 
explanatory power in regressions involving institutional (or country) variables” (Leuz, 
2010:242). In this study, legal status is the only country-level variable and it is divided 
into two classifications as follows. 
 Legal status 
Considering the contingency theory, Doupnik and Salter (1995) have suggested that 
the external environment, the institutional structure and the cultural values support 
accounting divergence between countries. Furthermore, the institutional 
complementarities among countries imply the combination of institutional factors that 
are commonly detected (Leuz, 2010). Also, “classifying national accounting systems 
has long been an aspect of accounting research” (Nobes and Stadler, 2013:573). 
Due to the diversity of country classifications, this essay adopts two approaches, 
namely: the dichotomy common law versus code law countries and cluster 
classifications. Regarding the first approach, firms that belong to common law countries 
are expected to converge to IFRS (Nobes, 2008) and to improve their accounting quality 
(La Porta et al., 1998). In what it concerns to cluster classification, Leuz’s (2010) 
cluster classification is adopted using regulatory and reporting practice variables. It 
consists of three clusters, as previously mentioned, namely: cluster 1 – outsider 
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economies, cluster 2 – insider economies with better legal enforcement systems, and 
cluster 3 – insider economies with weaker legal enforcement systems. Firms that belong 
to cluster 1 tend to show a higher disclosure level. Annex A presents Leuz’s (2010) 
cluster classification. 
Regarding the fact that disclosure practices under discussion in this study includes 
mandatory but also voluntary disclosure requirements of IAS 41 and, additionally, the 
recommended best practices by PwC (2011), above considerations indicate an expected 
positive sign for the relation in the following branches: common law and cluster 1. 
H9: There is a significant positive association between firms that belong to common 
law countries and the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning 
biological assets. 
H10: There is a significant positive association between firms that belong to cluster 1 
and the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure concerning biological assets. 
The hypotheses, proxies and expected signals of independent variables introduced 
above are described in the table 2.1. Data were collected in DataStream.  
The biological assets intensity (BIO) corresponds to a ratio between biological assets 
and total assets. Ownership concentration (HELD) is the ratio between the number of 
closely held shares (shares held by insiders) and the common shares outstanding (the 
most recent common shares outstanding available in the database, which relates to the 
difference between issued shares and treasury shares). Prior literature measures firm 
size (SIZE) in several different ways. In this essay, firm size corresponds to the 
logarithm of total assets. Auditor type (AUDIT) is a dummy variable coded 1 for clients 
of the Big 4 auditing firms and 0 otherwise. In 2011, the Big 4 auditors are PwC, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young and KPMG. The internationalisation level 
(INT) corresponds to a ratio between foreign sales and total sales4. Listing status 
(STOCK) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is listed on one foreign stock 
                                                          4 It is expected that firms internationalise by opening explorations in different countries. Probably, in this case, foreign sales are low because each exploration sells to the country where it is located. As a result, this variable could be measured, for example, by the number of countries where the firms are located (instead of the sales ratio adopted). Therefore, the sales by geographic segment variable was identified in DataStream (variable WS19601). This was tested for a sample of firms, considering the ratio between this variable WS19601 (selecting segments of foreign countries with the variable WS19600) and the net sales (variable WS01001), and the results were the same that are obtained by variable WS08731. Consequently, in this essay this is the adopted variable (variable WS08731).  
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exchange or multi-listing and 0 otherwise. Profitability (ROE) corresponds to the proxy 
return on equity. This is measured by the ratio between pre-tax income and common 
equity5. Sector (SECTOR) relates to SIC code classification (two-digit), namely: sector 
1 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining (01-14), sector 2 – manufacturing (20-39), 
and other sectors.  
Table 2.1. Hypotheses, variable proxies and expected signals 
Hypotheses Variable proxies Expected signals Biological assets 
intensity 
BIO – Biological assets (WS18277, WS18278, or WS18258) 
divided by total assets (WS02999) multiplied by 100 
Positive 
Ownership 
concentration 
HELD – Closely-held shares percentage (WS08021) Negative 
Firm size SIZE – Logarithm of the total assets (WS02999) Positive 
Auditor type AUDIT – Binary variable based on whether the firm is audited by a 
Big 4 auditing firm (WS07800) 
Positive 
Internationalisation 
level 
INT – Foreign sales percentage (WS08731) Positive 
Listing status STOCK – Binary variable based on whether the firm is listed in one 
or more than one foreign stock exchange (WS05427) 
Positive 
Profitability ROE – Pretax income (WS01401) divided by common equity 
(WS03501) multiplied by 100 
No expected 
signal 
Sector SECTOR – Dummy variable based on whether the firm belongs to 
sector 1, 2 or others regarding SIC code classification (WS07021) 
Positive 
Legal status 
LEGAL – Binary variable based on whether the firm belongs to a 
common law or code law country 
Positive 
CLUSTER – Dummy variable based on whether the firm belongs to 
cluster 1, 2 or 3, regarding Leuz’s (2010) cluster classification 
Positive 
Finally, the legal status is measured by two proxies (LEGAL and CLUSTER). “A 
classification should be based on detailed observation of characteristics” and “the 
characteristics chosen should ideally be informed by the purpose of the classification” 
(Nobes and Stadler, 2013:584). Consequently, the LEGAL variable is computed based 
                                                          5 Instead of adopting WS08301 that corresponds directly to return on equity-total %, the purpose of using the ratio between pre-tax income WS01401 and common equity WS03501 was to neglect the tax effect. 
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on Nobes (2008), La Porta et al. (1998)6 and corresponds to a binary variable coded 1 
for firms that belong to a common law country, and 0 if firms belong to a code law 
country. The CLUSTER variable is computed based on Leuz’s (2010) cluster 
classification regarding regulatory and reporting practice variables. This classification 
includes an earnings management and opacity score from Leuz et al. (2003), which has 
been emphasised by Nobes and Stadler (2013:582) as having “specified the purpose of 
their own attempts, apart from organizing knowledge”. In case of the firms whose 
countries are not considered in Leuz’s (2010) cluster classification, some of them were 
classified according to Amiraslani et al. (2013), who follow the same taxonomy, and a 
few other firms were classified based on the proximity of their countries to other 
countries included in the three clusters. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Selection 
To examine the potential associations between mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets and firm and country-level determinants, with recent data, this essay 
explores disclosure by listed firms covering biological assets during 2011. Data were 
collected in DataStream. Firstly, countries were selected that adopted IFRS until 2010, 
to prevent possible biased data that could result from analysing the year of adoption in 
2011, given the exemptions and exceptions allowed by IFRS 1. Then, considering the 
corresponding selection of countries, firms that have biological assets were selected. 
The criterion was to follow one of the biological assets variables (WS18277: biological 
assets – net book value; WS18278: biological assets – gross; WS18258: biological 
assets – current). The result was 282 firms from several countries and different sectors, 
but 12 of them do not have an available 2011 annual report, so the actual number of 
analysed firms was 270. When any of the proxies of the independent variables was not 
available in DataStream, there was an effort to obtain information in 2011 annual report 
to mitigate the effect of missing information in this study.  
                                                          6 To assure this classification in a few firms whose countries are not considered in both studies, it was used as source of information the World Factbook (CIA, 2015). 
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2.4.2. Disclosure index 
In order to provide a disclosure measure for the present study, firstly and regarding 
voluntary disclosure, there are several papers that include both the extent and the 
quality-based analysis related to the corresponding topic of interest (Abraham and 
Shrives, 2014; Bellora and Guenther, 2013; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011; Van Staden 
and Hooks, 2007). According to Hooks and Van Staden (2011) the first analysis 
quantifies the extent of reporting on a specific issue using several measures such as 
words, sentences or pages and the second analysis evaluates the quality of the 
disclosures using a quality index. There are several limitations what it concerns the 
extent-based analysis. For example, Steenkamp and Northcott (2007) state that the 
researcher’s role is crucial to establish what information is materialised from a content 
analysis; in spite of the focus being the text, it can be interpreted in several ways; also, 
the scope of the analysed text is delimited by its context. Marston and Shrives (1991) 
comment that there are repetitions of specific words in the annual reports and that firms 
also differ in the complexity of their operations, which allow to conclude that measuring 
information by counting numbers or words is not the ideal answer. 
Considering mandatory disclosure and, for example, given compliance with goodwill 
impairment disclosures, Amiraslani et al. (2013) have concluded that there is an 
excessive use of boilerplate language combined with the wording restate related to the 
corresponding standard, exercising a minimum level of judgment. Furthermore, and 
with the purpose of mitigating these boilerplate disclosures, on 27th June 2013, at the 
IFRS Foundation conference, Hans Hoogervorst, the Chairman of the IASB, has 
encouraged to exclude nonmaterial disclosures relating to “less is often more” and to 
avoid the risk of annual reports turning into merely compliance documents, rather than 
means of communication (IFRS Foundation, 2013b).  
Given the previous clarification and the fact that more disclosure could not be 
synonymous of higher disclosure quality, the present study adopts a quality-based 
analysis. Therefore and based on prior research (Lan et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2013; 
Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998; Inchausti, 1997), this essay includes a disclosure index as a dependent variable. 
Concerning to biological assets, Scherch et al. (2013), Silva et al. (2012), Theiss et al. 
(2012) adopted this approach within Brazilian context. 
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The index is built based on the disclosures required by IAS 41 and calculated with 
the notes to the consolidated financial statements included in 2011 annual report of this 
selection of firms7. “Although there are several ways of communicating company 
information, such as interim reporting, press releases, letters, etc., the annual report is 
still considered the major medium disclosing information” (Akhtaruddin, 2005:407).  
This index includes three categories: mandatory items, non-mandatory but 
recommended items and non-mandatory and non-recommended items. The first and the 
second classifications cover all disclosure items required by IAS 41. The last category 
concerns voluntary information indicating that firms have exceeded IAS 41 disclosure 
requirements. Actually, “an index can include a mixture of items required by regulation 
and voluntary items if this suits the purpose of the research project” (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991:195). Given the intrinsic complexity of biological assets fair valuation, 
non-mandatory and non-recommended items are only applicable to firms that measure 
biological assets at fair value. This third classification is constructed according to PwC 
(2011). Three topics are identified as being followed by their clients in disclosure 
practices, where the timber sector is concerned, namely: revealing the complexity of 
various parameters regarding the effect on the valuation (but there is limited information 
regarding the effect on the valuation); providing more information on the effects of 
variations in key factors; exposing assumptions on future prices and costs, as well as 
disclosing a sensitivity analysis with multiple parameters. The items selected for 
inclusion in the disclosure index and the results are shown in Appendix A. 
Based on the literature about this research topic (Santos et al., 2013; Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), the disclosure index is dichotomous, 
unweighted and adjusted for non-applicable items. Firstly, a score of 1 is assigned to an 
item if it is disclosed, and a score of 0 otherwise, which means that the index is 
dichotomous. The maximum number of items is 40. Secondly, each item is equally 
important for all three categories. Although a weighted index permits some 
dissimilarities, given the relative importance of certain items of information (Inchausti, 
1997), here the assumption is that an unweighted approach will result in a minor bias, 
because the effort of the index relies in all three categories. Finally, the index follows a 
                                                          7 The analysis of the annual reports was performed by one researcher. In order to assure robustness of the index calculation and to minimise possible coding bias, the researcher coded the information twice and any discrepancies were solved. 
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tolerant criterion (Santos et al., 2013) and covers the applicability of any item to each 
firm. It excludes the items when there is no information in the notes to the consolidated 
financial statements about one disclosure item of IAS 41. In this sense, adopting an 
adjusted index neglects the effect if the selected firms measure biological assets at fair 
value or at historical cost. There is only one exemption regarding the last attribute, the 
following item of IAS 41 [IAS 41.49]: “financial risk management strategies related to 
agricultural activity”. Risk strategy related to biological assets is highly important in the 
sense that a firm is required to declare the overall strategy in the annual report. 
Therefore, if this item contains no information it is considered in the index as a non-
disclosed item. In fact, “disclosure may not be purely an economic decision, particularly 
when social and political aspects also need to be considered” (Abraham and Shrives, 
2014:93).  
The total score of the mandatory and voluntary disclosure index for biological assets 
(Index) in a firm is: 
m
dIndex
m
i ii
 1         (2.1) 
where di = 0 or 1, as follows: di = 1 if the item is disclosed and di = 0, otherwise; m = 
maximum number of applicable items a firm may disclose. 
Finally, the index follows two criteria, namely, reliability and validity, supported by 
Marston and Shrives (1991). It is reliable in the sense that the results can be replicated 
by another researcher and it is valid in the sense that it serves the purpose of the 
research. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. 
There is a wide range in the disclosure index (INDEX) in the selection: the highest 
disclosure score obtained is 100 and the lowest is 0. Appendix B presents the 10 
selected firms that have higher and lower disclosure level with the corresponding 
country and sector. The mean disclosure score is 56.55 (median=59.00).  
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The average biological assets intensity (BIO) is 11.65% but the median is less than 
4.52% and this variable lists a maximum of 95.38%. The firm size (SIZE) mean is 
13.02% (median=12.87%) and registers a maximum of 17.84%. 
In terms of ownership concentration (HELD), internationalisation level (INT) and 
profitability (ROE), even though some observations are collected in annual reports 
when the DataStream has no information, these are the independent variables with more 
missing values (n=228, 221 and 256, respectively). With regard to profitability, 9 
observations were removed because they were identified as outliers. 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Selection:  1 270  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Observ. INDEX 56.55 59.00 100.00 0.00 20.90 -0.43 270 BIO 11.65 4.51 95.38 0.0(1) 16.65 2.35 270 HELD 54.32 60.22 99.74 0.01 28.24 -0.43 228 SIZE 13.02 12.87 17.84 7.27 1.86 0.07 270 INT 46.00 40.59 100.00 0.00 38.60 0.11 221 ROE 8.58 9.77 52.02 -57.20 16.39 -0.68 256 
          Frequency Percent Index 
AUDIT Firm audited by a Non- Big 4 auditing firm 72 26.67 56.00 Firm audited by a Big 4 auditing firm 198 73.33 57.00 
STOCK Firm not listed on any foreign stock exchange  214 79.26 56.00 Firm listed on one foreign stock exchange or multi-listing  56 20.74 58.00 
SECTOR 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 86 31.85 60.00 
Manufacturing 150 55.56 57.00 
Others 34 12.59 46.00 
LEGAL 
Common law 107 39.63 59.00 Code law 160 59.26 55.00 
No label 38 1.11 48.00 
CLUSTER 
Cluster 1 103 38.15 58.00 Cluster 2 97 35.93 58.00 Cluster 3 58 21.48 53.00 
No label 129 4.44 50.00 
In terms of dummy variables, the previous table provides the average disclosure 
index for each variable. The majority of the selection of firms (73.33%) is audited by a 
                                                          8 These firms represent the countries Cyprus, Mauritius and United Arab Emirates. Regarding the World Factbook (CIA, 2015), these countries have a mixed classification: Cyprus and Mauritius correspond to common law/civil law and United Arab Emirates corresponds to muslim law/civil law. 9 These firms represent the countries Cayman Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Kuwait, Mauritius, Oman, Russian Federation, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates. These countries are not included in Leuz’s (2010) cluster classification. Furthermore, there is no additional information that supports a plausible classification. 
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Big 4 auditing firm (AUDIT), only 20.74% corresponds to firms that are listed in one 
foreign stock exchange or multi-listing (STOCK) and the average disclosure index is 
almost the same for both variables, about 57. Taking into consideration the sector, 
31.85% of the selected firms relates to agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 
represents the highest average disclosure index of 60 (SECTOR). The frequency of 
sector “Others” is presented in Appendix C. 
Finally, considering legal status (LEGAL), 59.26% corresponds to the firms that 
belong to a code law country and the selection is relatively homogenous in terms of 
cluster classification (CLUSTER). Once again, there are no significant differences in 
the average disclosure indexes.  
Appendix A summarises, by disclosure item, the number of firms that disclose 
biological assets information. The most frequently reported items are: “A reconciliation 
of changes in the carrying amount of biological assets between the beginning and the 
end of the period” (n=248; [IAS 41.50]); “This reconciliation includes desegregation” 
(n=242; [IAS 41.50]); and “A description of each group of biological assets” (n=230; 
[IAS 41.41]). This evidence is consistent with prior literature (Silva et al., 2012) for 
Brazilian firms. The least reported items are: “The range of estimates within which fair 
value is highly likely to lie” (n=2; [IAS 41.54]), when the entity measures biological 
assets at their cost less any accumulated depreciation and any accumulated impairment 
losses; and “Unfulfilled conditions and other contingencies attaching to government 
grants” (n=1; [IAS 41.57]). 
In the overall, these findings suggest that there is an opportunity for improving 
biological assets disclosure, as concluded by PwC (2011) for the timber sector. 
Additionally, Appendix D presents the ranking of countries by the number of firms and 
their average disclosure level. 
Pearson’s correlation matrix between all variables is shown in table 2.3. The 
dependent variable is positively correlated to biological assets intensity at 1% level of 
significance. 
It is commonly established that correlations between independent variables are not 
risky in multivariate analysis unless they exceed 0.80 or 0.90 (Gujarati, 1995). Since 
there are no highly correlated independent variables, all variables are maintained in the 
model. 
32 
 
Table 2.3. Pearson’s correlation 
  INDEX  BIO  HELD  SIZE  INT  ROE  
INDEX       BIO  0.428*** ***    HELD  0.118*** -0.009***    SIZE 0.001*** -0.121*** -0.230***   INT  0.053*** 0.163*** -0.090*** 0.268***  ROE  0.086*** 0.091*** -0.006*** 0.231*** 0.036***  Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
The table demonstrates that firm size is negatively correlated to biological assets 
intensity and ownership concentration at 10% and 1% level of significance, respectively 
and positively correlated to internationalisation level and profitability at 1% level of 
significance. Finally, biological assets intensity is positively correlated at 5% level of 
significance with internationalisation level. 
2.5.2. OLS regression model 
Regarding the following OLS regression model, two equations are considered for the 
country-level determinant. The results are provided in table 2.4. In both regressions, the 
presence of heteroscedasticity is analysed with White's general test (White, 1980). This 
test indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity in both regressions; as a result, both 
equations are re-estimated, adjusting the standard errors for heteroscedasticity.  
i
j
j j
i
uLEGALbSECTORb
ROEbSTOCKbINTbAUDITbSIZEbHELDbBIObbIndex

  9318 76543210  (2.2) 
i
l
l l
j
j j
i
uCLUSTERbSECTORb
ROEbSTOCKbINTbAUDITbSIZEbHELDbBIObbIndex

   319318 76543210  (2.3) 
Table 2.4 presents the estimation results. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure is 
statistically positive related to biological assets intensity, firm size, sector (agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, mining and manufacturing), to belong to a common law country and to 
the cluster 1 and surprisingly to ownership concentration, as explained below. This table 
assures the feasibility of the regression model by explaining the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure with an adjusted R-squared of 0.215 that increases in the second 
equation to 0.235. 
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Regarding the firm-level determinants on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets, the finding related to biological assets intensity is consistent with 
Scherch et al. (2013) and also with other non-financial assets, for example goodwill 
impairment (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Glaum et al. 2013; Heitzman et al., 2010; Shalev, 
2009) and provisions (Chavent et al., 2006). Concerning firm size, this finding is 
consistent with prior literature (Amiraslani et al., 2013; Glaum et al., 2013; Lan et al., 
2013; Oliveira et al., 2006; Depoers, 2000). 
Table 2.4. OLS regression model 
Equation:  (2.2)   (2.3)  Selection:  1 269   1 269 Included observations:  187 after adjustments  180 after adjustments Dependent variable:   INDEX   INDEX  Variable  coefficient t-statistic  coefficient t-statistic Constant  9.117 0.632***  11.943 0.787*** BIO  0.704 4.161***  0.781 4.202 *** HELD  0.118 2.212***  0.114 2.196*** SIZE  1.873 1.881***  1.646 1.611*** AUDIT  -0.989 -0.271***  -1.116 -0.286*** INT  -0.036 -0.992***  -0.026 -0.693*** STOCK  -4.523 -1.192***  -4.833 -1.221*** ROE  0.017 0.187***  0.005 0.049*** SECTOR1=1  13.462 2.920***  10.738 2.456*** SECTOR2=1  11.249 2.591***  10.112 2.482*** LEGAL  5.451 1.821***    CLUSTER1=1     6.679 1.681*** CLUSTER2=1     1.956 0.514*** R-squared  0.257***   0.282***  Adjusted R-squared  0.215***   0.235***  S.E. of regression  18.600***   18.060***  F-statistic  6.089***   5.985***  Wald F-statistic  3.816***   3.508***  Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Taking sector into consideration, Amiraslani et al. (2013) have concluded that the oil 
and gas sector reveals a high level of compliance in the impairment-intensive sector. In 
this essay, considering equation (2.2) on average and other parameters being equal, 
firms in sector 1 (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining) and sector 2 (manufacturing) 
exhibit a disclosure level, which is, respectively, 13.46% and 11.25% higher than the 
disclosure level of firms that belong to other sectors, (and considering equation (2.3), 
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the results are 10.74% and 10.11%, respectively, with the same sign). This finding is 
consistent with the fact that these sectors are associated with biological assets. On the 
subject of ownership concentration, Depoers (2000) rejects the influence of this variable 
on voluntary disclosure in the French context. Also, Rahman et al. (2002) have 
compared accounting regulations and accounting practices in Australia and New 
Zealand and revealed that although ownership concentration does not seem to be related 
to mandatory disclosure, exhibits a positive sign related to voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the relation between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and the type of 
auditor, internationalisation level, listing status and profitability, is not supported by the 
results. Regarding the type of auditor, this result is probably related to the fact that the 
majority of the firms are audited by a Big 4 auditing firm, and so the variable has little 
explanatory power. Regarding the negative sign, Lan et al. (2013) have analysed the 
voluntary disclosure determinants of Chinese listed firms and have suggested that 
probably the firms audited by the Big 4 auditing firms kept more attention than other 
firms and tend to disclose more information through other means, such as media. Also, 
and regarding biological assets disclosure, Elad and Herbohn (2011:116) have 
concluded that “notwithstanding this low level of compliance none of the companies 
received a qualified audit opinion due to insufficient disclosure. Presumably, the 
auditors adopted a flexible approach that recognises the salience of each item and the 
individual circumstances of each company when assessing the adequacy of disclosure”. 
Bearing in mind internationalisation level, Oliveira et al. (2006) have also rejected that 
the extent of voluntary disclosure of intangibles information is positively related to the 
internationalisation of the firm, which was measured by the same variable. In what it 
concerns with listing status, even though Oliveira et al. (2006) have concluded that this 
variable explains the extent of voluntary disclosure of intangibles information, it is 
verified to a lesser extent when compared to other factors. Amiraslani et al. (2013) state 
that this variable is not considered a significant determinant of compliance with 
goodwill impairment disclosure. Finally and considering profitability, Chavent et al. 
(2006) have investigated the 2011 annual report of 100 French firms that integrate the 
Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 stock index and found that the disclosure 
pattern is not associated with return on equity. In addition, Wallace and Naser (1995) 
have investigated firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of mandatory 
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disclosure in the corporate annual reports of listed firms in the Hong Kong stock 
exchange and have concluded that return on equity was less useful to explain variation 
in disclosure indexes. A possible explanation is that “reporting firms in HK tend to view 
lower profit margins as bad news and probably accept the provision of more details as 
part of their accountability to investors and other users of CARs (corporate annual 
reports)” (Wallace and Naser, 1995:346). 
Considering the country-level determinants on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets, the results of the LEGAL variable corroborate the theoretical 
background (La Porta et al., 1998). With regard to the CLUSTER variable, this result is 
confirmed by Amiraslani et al. (2013), who state the cluster 1 underlies the strong effect 
of an outside economy where IFRS compliance is concerned. 
2.6. Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research 
This chapter examines the disclosure level by listed firms on biological assets and the 
impact of firm and country-level determinants on mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets.  
Firstly, even though the majority of disclosure items are mandatory, the index stands 
in a wide range of values. Frequently firms disclose the reconciliation of changes of 
biological assets between the beginning and the end of the period with desegregation 
and tend to avoid the requirement of disclosing the range of estimates of fair value. 
Then and considering stakeholder, agency and signalling theories, the firm-level 
determinants, namely: biological assets intensity, firm size and to belong to agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors have a significant positive impact on mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure practices. Surprisingly, ownership concentration has also a 
significant positive impact on mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices. Taking into 
consideration country-level determinants supported by contingency theory, the results 
corroborate the theoretical background. Firms that belong to common law countries or 
to outsider economies improve the extent of the mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
biological assets. 
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, because there was only one 
researcher involved in this research, inter-coder reliability cannot be guaranteed 
concerning the construction of the disclosure index used to measure the disclosure level 
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of biological assets. For example, there are no defined rules to deciding which 
paragraphs of IAS 41 should be grouped and which should represent one index item, as 
well as deciding if an item is applicable to a specific firm or not, so the information was 
treated according to the researchers’ best judgment. To minimise possible coding bias, 
the researcher coded the information twice and any discrepancies were solved. 
Secondly, this study focuses on the impact of specific firm determinants over disclosure 
practices, but there are maybe other relevant variables to consider, such as leverage. 
Future research on this area could also follow other classifications regarding firms or 
countries. Furthermore, it could be analysed how the impact of environmental 
regulations at the country-level influences firms’ incentives to disclosure information 
with respect to IAS 41. 
In spite of these limitations, this research brings important contributions to the 
literature in this area. This essay has extended the studies to a worldwide selection, 
assuring that a larger number of countries and determinants with recent data are 
included. This study is particularly useful to standard setters since IAS 41 was recently 
under an ongoing project for review. In addition, this work has several implications for 
different users. Firstly it promotes awareness among accounting regulators concerning 
the disclosure requirements constraints of biological assets, which relate to smaller 
firms and firms where biological assets do not represent the core business. Moreover, 
stakeholders of small firms also benefit once they recognise that there is less disclosed 
information. Finally, all other stakeholders benefit because they will be aware of 
disclosure level and its determinants. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Accounting for Biological Assets: 
Measurement practices of listed firms 
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3.1. Introduction 
IAS 41 deals with the concept of “living assets”, which represents the singular 
characteristic of natural biological growth that historical cost valuation is unable to 
manage (Herbohn et al., 1998). As a basic rule, this standard requires biological assets 
to be measured at fair value less costs to sell on initial recognition and at subsequent 
reporting dates.  
This severe change from traditional historical cost model (Oliveira et al., 2015; Elad 
and Herbohn, 2011; Lefter and Roman, 2007) has been responsible for the debate on 
agricultural accounting (Argilés et al., 2011). IAS 41 has been also censured for being 
excessively theoretical and for presenting unsuitable measurement methods for 
biological assets (Herbohn and Herbohn, 2006). Moreover, Aryanto (2011) has claimed 
that the accretion concept in IAS 41 is overgeneralised, which means that this standard 
establishes the same treatment for all biological assets. In the particular case of bearer 
biological assets the corresponding fair value is very difficult to achieve due to the 
absence of an active market, as previously mentioned. There are also other factors, 
namely: difficulty to detect attributes of bearer plants; incurred costs related to the fair 
value estimate that outweighs the benefits; earnings volatility and misleading; as well as 
the lack of relevant information and knowledge (Muhammad, 2014; Aryanto, 2011).  
Furthermore, the single exception allowed to fair value measurement is only applied 
to initial recognition and in a particular context: a market-determined price is not 
available and the entity cannot assure a reliable estimate of fair value [IAS 41.30]. In 
such conditions, the entity uses the unreliability clause of fair value and measures the 
biological assets at cost less depreciation and impairment.  
At first glance, and regarding the obligation of IAS 41 to measure biological assets at 
fair value, it may seem less reasonable to analyse it as a matter of choice. “We expect 
companies to use fair value measurement when required to do so by accounting 
standards. That is, we expect companies to comply with the mandatory fair value 
measurement requirements in IAS 39, IAS 41 and IFRS 2. Large companies (as 
included in this study) have both the available resources and necessary incentives to 
comply with accounting standards” (Cairns et al., 2011:7). Subsequently, if there are 
firms that use the unreliability clause of fair value, ideally this should mean that firms 
are unable to report biological assets at fair value. However, and according to some 
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literature, it seems that there are other reasons related to firm and country environment 
that could explain the adoption of historical cost, even when the clause does not apply 
(Taplin et al., 2014; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013; Guo and Yang, 2013; Hlaing and 
Pourjalali, 2012; Elad and Herbohn, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010; Quagli and Avallone, 
2010; Daniel et al., 2010; Muller et al., 2008; Elad, 2004). Therefore, to this extent, this 
research is developed under the accounting choice theory. 
On one hand, previous literature concerning the cultural and institutional impacts of 
IAS 41 in accounting harmonisation in agriculture (Elad and Herbohn, 2011) has 
revealed that Anglo-Saxon countries have a straight relationship with this standard and 
are receptive to fair value measurement. For example, Fisher et al. (2010) have analysed 
the adoption of IAS 41 in New Zealand (classified as a common law country) and have 
concluded that listed firms operating in the agricultural sector follow fair value, even 
when there is no active market. Consequently, it seems that fair value measurement is 
not a problem in this country. In Continental Europe, historical cost is the mainstream 
method (Elad, 2004).  
On the other hand, and due to the lack of studies concerning measurement 
determinants of biological assets, this study has relied on literature related to this 
discussion topic for other non-financial assets, such as investment property, plant, 
property and equipment. As far as non-financial assets are concerned, in general, larger 
firms, which are more leveraged, and have more non-financial assets and higher 
expertise in fair value measurements, tend to choose the option of fair value accounting 
(Daniel et al., 2010). With regard to investment property, fair value is preferred when 
this measure tends to improve performance measurement (Christensen and Nikolaev, 
2013), also information asymmetry, contractual efficiency and managerial opportunism 
are factors that explain the adoption of fair value (Quagli and Avallone, 2010). 
In addition, in June 2014, IASB has approved the adjustment in IAS 41 that allows 
firms to choose either the cost or the revaluation models for mature bearer plants 
according to IAS 16 – Property, plant and equipment, for annual periods beginning on 
or after 1 January 2016. Within the context of the corresponding project settled by 
IASB, Muhammad (2014) has proposed to develop a study in Malaysia in order to 
identify the factors that influence bearer biological assets, and consequently establish a 
fair value model. Chief executive officers, accountants and managers linked to firms 
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that have bearer biological assets are the respondents of this study, due to their expertise 
and knowledge on this subject. 
Taking into account the measurement practices of biological assets and other non-
financial assets as documented in previous literature, the aim of this chapter is to 
explore the following research question:  
 What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in practices used to 
measure biological assets among listed firms? 
In order to address this question, this study establishes several hypotheses that relate 
the measurement practices of biological assets with firm and country-level 
determinants. To identify if the firms measure biological assets at fair value or claim for 
the allowed exception and measure biological assets at historical cost, the study 
analyses the notes to the consolidated financial statements included in the 2012 annual 
report of a worldwide selection composed of 324 firms from 33 IFRS adopting 
countries. Appendix E exhibits the number of firms by country with the related 
measurement practice. Bearing in mind previous studies, this essay provides a broader 
research as it considers a larger number of countries and determinants with recent data. 
The study is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a literature review, firstly by 
focusing on the debate of measurement requirements of IAS 41, and then by discussing 
the influence of firm and country-level determinants. Section 3.3 introduces the 
hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the methodology and presents the selection. Section 
3.5 discusses the ﬁndings from the empirical analysis. Finally, the chapter provides a 
brief conclusion. 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Measurement requirements of IAS 41 
The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is one of the most 
extensively discussed subjects in the literature (Hail et al., 2010; Laux and Leuz, 2010). 
In the particular case of biological assets the constraints of implementing the IAS 41 
related to fair valuation have been investigated by various authors (Gabriel and Stefea, 
2013; Elad and Herbohn, 2011; Argilés et al., 2009; George, 2007; Herbohn and 
Herbohn, 2006; Argilés and Slof, 2001). 
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Firstly, as mentioned before, Elad and Herbohn (2011) have demonstrated a high 
level of agreement where the costs of measuring biological assets at fair value outweigh 
the corresponding benefits. This is the particular case of plantation firms in which the 
fair value of tropical crops such as rubber trees, oil palm and tea can only be ascertained 
at excessive costs. Additionally, their study covers a wide-range of biased fair value 
estimates and suppositions that could imply different results. Elad and Herbohn (2011) 
argue that there is a need for IASB to revisit IAS 41. Another concern is the apparent 
need for the auditor to write an audit report about the firms’ financial statements that 
claim “the reader’s attention to inherent uncertainties regarding the valuation of 
biological assets under IAS 41” (Elad and Herbohn, 2011:107). As a matter of fact, in 
some cases, auditors and managers collide in disagreement.  
Additionally, Herbohn and Herbohn (2006) have evaluated the impact of IAS 41 in 
the forestry sector of the accounting standard AASB (Australian Accounting Standards 
Board) 1037 – Self-generating and regenerating assets, in Australia, as well as the 
methods of forestry valuation. They have highlighted the subjectivity of fair value 
measurement and the volatility of results related to unrealised gains and losses that are 
recognised in the income statement. There is a question that remains not answered: “do 
such accounting procedures (fair value measurement) reflect the nature of investment in 
forestry” (Herbohn and Herbohn, 2006:175)? 
Furthermore, Gabriel and Stefea (2013) argue that IAS 41 must be carefully analysed 
according to the impact of production forecast in accounting, to the impact of fair value 
measurement over cash flows, and also to the possibility for firms to use accounting in 
their own interests. Firstly, given the fact that crop production depends on climatic 
conditions, the relevant fair value that is achieved today given specific assumptions 
could not be any more the same on the day after. Secondly, the fair value changes along 
different periods could imply recognition of gains, and overall, it could determine a loss 
at the point of harvest. Finally, with regard to the diversity of fair valuation models, 
managers could choose a specific measurement in order to serve their own interests. 
In order to exemplify such limitations, George (2007), Director of the SIPEF Belgian 
group (international agro-industrial conglomerate), states that, nowadays, instead of 
historical cost, there is a permeable concept of fair value, which impacts on accounting 
information and difficults auditing opinion. Actually, Deloitte, SIPEF’s auditing firm 
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draws attention of financial users to the uncertainty caused by the fair value adoption. 
Consequently, SIPEF isolates such effect, in the financial statements, so that the 
potential investor can analyse the results before and after fair value adoption. 
In spite of previous contributions, Argilés et al. (2009) have concluded that fair 
valuation does not imply gain volatility, and assure a higher predictive power of future 
results. They have analysed the impact of using fair value in biological assets in Spain, 
considering a sample of about 500 Spanish firms from the agricultural sector. Therefore, 
fair valuation allows the manager to anticipate financial problems. Also, the 
improvement in results precision mitigates agency problems, as managers are perceived 
even more as specialised accountants. 
In addition to measurement requirements of IAS 41, there are other motivations, 
namely firm and country-level determinants that support fair valuation on biological 
assets, which are shown in the next sub-section.  
3.2.2. Influence of firm and country-level determinants 
Due to the lack of studies on firm-level determinants of biological assets 
measurement, this study has relied on literature where the topic of examining these 
determinants – that explain the differences in measurement practices among listed firms, 
is discussed for other non-financial assets (Taplin et al., 2014; Christensen and 
Nikolaev, 2013; Hlaing and Pourjalali, 2012; Quagli and Avallone, 2010; Daniel et al., 
2010; Muller et al., 2008), such as investment property and plant, property and 
equipment. Table 3.1 summarises the analysed papers. They have in common some of 
the determinants that explain the adoption of fair value for non-financial assets and also 
the applied methodology, the binary models, with logistic regressions (the only 
exception is the study of Hlaing and Pourjalali (2012) that includes a probit regression). 
Taking in to consideration country-level determinants, there are some international 
studies that deal with the influence of the country origin on biological assets 
measurement (Guo and Yang, 2013; Elad and Herbohn, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010; Elad, 
2004). In general, common law countries in opposite from code law countries tend to 
apply in a large extent fair value to biological assets. 
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Table 3.1. Firm-level determinants 
Paper Assets Selection Variables Main conclusions 
Taplin et al. 
(2014) 
Investment 
property 
96 listed firms 
(randomly 
selected)  
China 
2008 
Leverage (book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total assets) 
Listing status (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is internationally listed) 
International revenue (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm reports revenue 
from international sources) 
Earnings management (ratio of the standard deviation of operating income 
divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from the operation) 
Ownership concentration (% of shares outstanding that are held by directors) 
Less evidence supports the usage of fair value model for 
firms with higher leverage. 
Listed firms overseas, with international operations and 
higher volatility of reported earnings are more likely to 
use fair value model. 
Firms with more dispersed ownership tend to adopt fair 
value in order to reduce information asymmetry.  
Christensen 
and 
Nikolaev 
(2013) 
Investment 
property 
 
275 firms  
The United 
Kingdom, 
Germany 
2005 
Country (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is domiciled in this country)  
CountrySic65 (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has SIC code 65 (real 
estate) among its first five SIC code classification) 
Leverage (total liabilities divided by market value of assets) 
 
Fair value adoption is influenced by: 
Institutional differences; 
Measure’s ability to improve firm performance (which is 
related to how an asset is used, to hold or to trade it).  
The cost of calculating fair value, conversely related to the 
asset’s liquidity, is the main reason for managers to avoid 
fair value. 
Hlaing and 
Pourjalali 
(2012) 
Property, 
plant and 
equipment 
232 firms  
The United 
States of 
America 
2004-2007 
Size (logarithm of the total assets) 
Tangibility (ratio of total net property, plant and equipment to total assets) 
Leverage (ratio of long-term debt to total assets) 
Larger firms, with higher ratio of the total amount of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets are more 
likely to use the fair value model. 
Non-financial assets can be revaluated under manager 
discretion, in order to influence investors’ decisions, and 
for that reason, the reliability of this measurement is 
controversial. 
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Paper Assets Selection Variables Main conclusions 
Quagli and 
Avallone 
(2010) 
Investment 
property 
 
76 firms 
Finland, France, 
Germany, 
Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden 
2005-2007 
Size (logarithm of the total assets) 
Leverage (debt to asset ratio) 
Market-to-book value (market-to-book ratio) 
Earnings smoothing (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has an earnings 
smoothing index higher than the average index of earnings smoothing in firm’s 
country of domicile) 
Contractual efficiency, information asymmetry and 
managerial opportunism are determinants of fair value. 
As proxies of contractual efficiency, size reduces the fair 
value choice and leverage seems not to influence it. 
Market-to-book ratio and earnings smoothing measure 
information asymmetry and managerial opportunism, 
respectively; both influence fair value choice negatively.  
Daniel et al. 
(2010) 
Non-
financial 
assets 
Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO)  
U.S. public 
firms  
2008 
Size (logarithm of the market value of equity) 
Tangibility (ratio of the property, plant and equipment to total assets) 
Expertise (measured as level 2 and level 3 assets scaled by total assets – both 
valuations for assets and liabilities, further explained in next sub-section, are 
more difficult and costly, given the absence of liquid markets) 
Leverage (long-term debt divided by total equity) 
Larger firms; higher ratio of non-financial assets to total 
assets; higher expertise in fair value measurements; and 
more leveraged firms are determinants of fair value for 
non-financial assets. 
Fair value adoption is related to the corresponding 
benefits and costs: this trade-off could be reflected in the 
cost of equity or debt capital of the firm and consequently 
could assure a better firm performance. 
Muller et al. 
(2008) 
Investment 
property  
77 real estate 
firms 
Continental 
Europe 
2004-2006 
Tangibility (ratio of the investment property to total assets) 
Ownership concentration (% of the stock held by insiders of the firm) 
International operations (% of the revenue generated from operations outside 
of the firm’s country of domicile) 
IFRS adoption indicator (dummy variable coded 1 if the firm adopts IFRS 
voluntarily prior to the mandatory adoption effective 2005) 
Fair value has been adopted for investment property, prior 
to IAS 40 mandatory adoption, when there was a higher 
investor demand for this information and also a larger 
commitment to assure financial reporting transparency. 
Evidence suggests that market participants distinguish 
diversity in the quality of fair value disclosure, even when 
this practice is followed under a required standard. 
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On the whole, according to Elad and Herbohn (2011), French firms follow historical 
cost valuation in biological assets, claiming that the fair value clause is unreliable. In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom and Australia, firms tend to adopt fair valuation, and in 
the case of bearer plants they involve independent external appraisers to calculate the 
present value of future net cash flows in biological assets. To some extent, the study 
supports that the cultural gap between these countries can explain the different 
accounting treatment. 
Taking into account another example of a common law country such as New Zealand, 
Fisher et al. (2010) have identified three main problems for financial report preparers, 
namely: the divergence between NZ IAS 41 and the traditional accounting framework; 
income recognition and measurement reliability given the absence of active markets for 
some biological assets. This study has highlighted that from listed firms, where the 
agricultural sector includes biological assets for which there was no or limited active 
markets, none have applied historical cost. This may suggest that fair valuation in this 
context does not appear to be a problem. 
Another international study concerning IAS 41 is developed by Elad (2004), which 
has provided a worldwide comparison between Europe, Africa and Australia. The study 
has concluded that fair value is more suitable than historical cost to those biological 
assets that have an active market, and more comprehensible to users of the information. 
African countries seem not to apply fair value, and Australian countries are followers of 
fair value, although they have identified a large volatility related to the fair valuation of 
biological assets. 
Finally and regarding a peculiar country as China, Guo and Yang (2013) argue that 
the factors that affect biological assets measurement are the comprehensiveness of the 
assets’ nature, the market environment and the balance between relevance and reliability 
of accounting information. Although the existence of a mature market and regulatory 
environment is suitable for fair valuation, it could also motivate performance 
manipulation. Currently, in this country the historical cost is desirable when compared 
to fair value. China should take hybrid measurement attributes in biological assets. 
Also, as markets become more mature and active, it is expected that fair value will 
replace historical cost. 
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3.3. Development of hypotheses 
Based on previous studies, this essay focuses on the following research question: 
 What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in practices used to 
measure biological assets among listed firms? 
Before explaining the hypotheses and in order to bring awareness to the selected 
firms of this study and ascertain any particular behaviour, the relationship between the 
measurement practice (fair value or historical cost) and the type of biological assets is 
tested with the chi-squared test (Greene, 2012). According to IAS 41, biological assets 
could be divided into bearer biological assets and consumable biological assets. Based 
on the 2012 annual report of the selected 324 listed firms, it was possible to identify the 
type of biological assets in each firm.  
Given the chi-squared test results presented in Appendix F, overall, biological assets 
and the measurement policy adopted by firms are related. Thus and based on the 
previous classification, namely, bearer biological assets and consumable biological 
assets, the selection was split and submitted under the same approach. The results allow 
concluding that although consumable biological assets and their measurement policy are 
also related, the same does not apply to bearer biological assets. In this case, both 
variables are independent. Since the bearer biological assets are more complex to 
measure due to the lack of active markets, this absence of relationship could lead to a 
higher propensity to follow the unreliability clause of fair value or even cause a higher 
discretionary managers’ behaviour. Consequently, it seems that there are other reasons 
that could support the measurement practices of bearer biological assets. 
Conceptually, several theories can explain measurement practices. In this study, 
accounting choice and agency theories support firm-level determinants and the 
contingency theory supports country-level determinants. 
In accordance with previous chapter, considering only two specific segments 
(country and firm) is supported by Luft and Shields (2014:555) that “reducing the 
number of plausible alternatives through narrow specification often contributes to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of research design.” 
The research model includes a binary dependent variable that corresponds to the 
measurement practice (one, if the firm measures biological assets at fair value; zero, if 
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the firm measures biological assets at historical cost), and explores several determinants 
that are expected to be related to the measurement of biological assets, namely, firm-
level variables – biological assets intensity, firm size, listing status, regulation expertise, 
potential growth, leverage and sector and country-level variable – legal status. 
3.3.1. Firm-level variables 
 Biological assets intensity 
As far as non-financial assets are concerned, in general, Daniel et al. (2010) conclude 
that firms tend to adopt fair value and therefore assure more value relevant10 
information to investors when intensity of non-financial assets is high. For property, 
plant and equipment, Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) and Hlaing and Pourjalali (2012) 
have also found that the likelihood of using fair value increases with the proportion of 
these assets to total assets. The authors state that costs of fair value outweigh the 
benefits when an asset represents a slight percentage of the statement of financial 
position. 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H1: Firms with more biological assets intensity are more likely to use fair value 
measurement model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause.  
 Firm size  
Regarding the positive theory of accounting policy choice, Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) conclude that size is significantly linked to the choice of a firm's income 
strategy. Moreover, larger firms denote higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and have equally the required resources and desirable motivations to act in 
accordance with accounting standards (Cairns et al., 2011), which in this study means 
measuring biological assets at fair value. 
Bearing in mind non-financial assets, Daniel et al. (2010) present two opposite 
perspectives related to firm size. On one hand, smaller firms are expected to be more 
reluctant to choose fair value because the implicit cost is higher for them. On the other 
                                                          10According to Barth and Clinch (1998:200) “value relevant” means that “the amount has a significant relation in the predicted direction with share prices or the non-market-based estimate of firm value”. 
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hand, smaller firms could be inclined to adopt fair value in order to reduce the 
information asymmetry between investors and managers. Quagli and Avallone (2010) 
also confirm that the variable size, as a proxy to political costs, reduces the likelihood of 
using fair value in investment property. 
Because of the mixed empirical evidence in prior literature, there is no strong 
expectation regarding the sign of this variable. 
H2: There is an association between firm size and use of fair value measurement 
model. 
 Listing status 
Stock exchange is the “primary enforcer of accounting standards” and it is seen as a 
“managerial choice variable(s)” (Hope, 2003:244). Daniel et al. (2010) state that firms 
with higher levels of international operations are more interested in fair market 
valuations arising from their international counterparts. 
The economic inferences of accounting choices drew the attention of researchers 
(Fields et al., 2001). Taplin et al. (2014) have focused on a group of economic 
motivations in order to explain the determinants of fair valuation for investment 
property. For example, they have confirmed that Chinese firms listed on foreign stock 
exchanges are expected to use fair value for this type of assets.  
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H3: Firms that are listed on one (or more) foreign stock exchange are more likely to 
use fair value measurement model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause. 
 Regulation expertise 
With regard to IFRS adoption, “as opposed to rules-based systems, accounting 
standards of the principles persuasion do not address every controversial issue at hand 
but keep considerable ambiguity about such major processes as record keeping and 
measurement” (Carmona and Trombeta, 2008:456). Therefore, this principle-based 
system assures a change in accountants’ skills and qualifications. Taking the 
measurement of biological assets into consideration, a higher level of regulation 
expertise would facilitate recognition of fair value. 
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For example, for fair value measurement of non-financial assets in general, Daniel et 
al. (2010) argue that firms with more level 2 and level 311 inputs are more likely to 
choose fair value option. Both level valuations are more complex and costly regarding 
the absence of liquid markets. Consequently, these firms already have experience in 
estimating fair value and are expected to be more receptive to this measurement. 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H4: Firms that have higher regulation expertise are more likely to use fair value 
measurement model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause. 
 Potential growth 
Growth opportunities have a potential effect on managers’ accounting choice (Daniel 
et al., 2010). Firms include assets-in-place, with a perceptible value and investment 
opportunities, with a value that is subject to discretionary judgments (Myers, 1977). 
Two different perspectives are addressed by Missonier-Piera (2007). Firstly, firms that 
have more growth opportunities than assets-in-place are expected to have a lower 
probability of revaluating their assets comparatively to firms with more assets-in-place. 
This happens because revaluating assets is usually associated to fixed assets. Secondly, 
and regarding information asymmetry, firms with more growth prospects than assets-in-
place are more familiar with their value than investors. Besides, to control activities of 
these firms is more challenging than controlling activities from firms composed mainly 
of assets-in-place. As such, and taking into account the agency theory, firms are more 
willing to revalue fixed assets in order to reduce information asymmetry with potential 
investors.  
Because of the mixed empirical evidence in prior literature, there is no strong 
expectation regarding the sign of this variable. 
                                                          11 Regarding IFRS 13 there are three levels of inputs, namely: Level 1 inputs are quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at the measurement date [IFRS 13:76]; Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted market prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly [IFRS 13:81]; Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the asset or liability; [IFRS 13:86]. An entity develops unobservable inputs using the best information available in the circumstances, which might include the entity's own data, taking into account all the information that is reasonably available about market participant assumptions [IFRS 13:87-89]. 
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H5: There is an association between potential growth and use of fair value 
measurement model. 
 Leverage  
Regarding the accounting choice theory, Fields et al. (2001) explain that contractual 
motivations mitigate agency costs due to the fact that settled contractual engagements 
assure less conflicts between agents. In particular managers tend to increase their 
compensation and decrease the probability of bond covenant violations by choosing 
accounting methods (Fields et al., 2001). Therefore, the higher the ratio between debt 
and equity, the higher the propensity of managers to follow strategies to increase 
income (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
In terms of investment property, Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) have found that 
leverage is a key determinant for fair value measurement. Moreover, based on fixed-
asset revaluations, Missonier-Piera (2007) supports the same relation and corresponding 
sign. Actually, “managers seeking to reduce financing costs may influence the 
accounting decisions to reduce the perceived risk of creditors, and thus reduce debt 
costs. (…) This choice will not only reduce information asymmetry about the assets' fair 
value but also will reduce leverage ratios and the related perceived bankruptcy risk” 
(Missonier-Piera; 2007:192). 
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H6: Firms with a higher leverage level are more likely to use fair value measurement 
model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause. 
 Sector 
As far as industry impact is concerned, Watts (1992) defends that accounting choice 
also varies according to different sectors. In particular, the contractual engagements are 
established based on a cost-benefit analysis. As costs of such affairs change from sector 
to sector, accounting procedures also differ between industries. For Fields et al. (2001), 
market imperfections are also responsible for manager’s accounting choice, namely 
agency costs, information asymmetries and externalities that influence non-contracting 
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parties. One example of externality is the pressure of industry organisations. Regulating 
accounting will assure a positive effect of the corresponding externality. 
In a study supporting that financial industry is willing to adopt new norms, Demaria 
and Dufour (2007) confirm that the financial sector is linked to IFRS choices in French 
context. Transposing to the present study, the above considerations would indicate an 
expected positive sign for the relation in agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and 
manufacturing sectors, as these are associated with biological assets. 
H7: Firms that belong to these sectors are more likely to use fair value measurement 
model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause. 
3.3.2. Country-level variable 
Overall, the attempt to classify accounting systems has been a familiar issue in 
accounting research (Nobes and Stadler, 2013). Country classification is one possible 
approach, supported by the contingency theory (Doupnik and Salter, 1995). 
 Legal status 
The previous chapter considered the dichotomy between common law and code law 
countries used by La Porta et al. (1998) and the cluster classification (Leuz, 2010), 
using regulatory and reporting practice variables. Instead of adopting any pre-
determined classification, this essay follows one of its frequent inputs: regulatory 
quality, a worldwide governance indicator by Kaufmann et al. (2011). 
As far as biological assets are concerned, Elad and Herbohn (2011) support that 
firms from common law countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, are fair 
value adopters, while Elad (2004) states that in Continental Europe, historical cost is the 
commonly used method.   
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H8: Firms that have a higher level of regulatory quality are more likely to use fair 
value measurement model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause. 
The hypotheses, proxies and expected signals of independent variables introduced 
above are described in table 3.2. Data were collected in DataStream. The biological 
assets intensity (BIO) corresponds to a ratio between biological assets and total assets 
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multiplied by 100. In accordance with the previous chapter, firm size (SIZE) 
corresponds to the logarithm of total assets. Listing status (STOCK) is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the firm is listed on one foreign stock exchange or multi-listed, and 0 
otherwise. Regulation expertise (IFRS) corresponds to the logarithm of the number of 
years that each firm follows IFRS. Potential growth (GROWTH) corresponds to market 
capitalization divided by common equity. Leverage (LEV) corresponds to the ratio 
between total liabilities divided by common shareholders' equity.  
Table 3.2. Hypotheses, variable proxies and expected signals 
Hypotheses Variable proxies Expected signals Biological assets 
intensity 
BIO – Biological assets (WS18277, or WS18278, or WS18258) 
divided by total assets (WS02999) multiplied by 100 
Positive 
Firm size SIZE – Logarithm of the total assets (WS02999) No expected 
signal 
Listing status STOCK – Binary variable based on whether the firm is listed in 
one or more than one foreign stock exchange (WS05427) 
Positive 
Regulation 
expertise 
IFRS – Logarithm of the number of years that each firm follows 
IFRS (WS07536) 
Positive 
Potential growth GROWTH – Market capitalization divided by common equity 
(WS09704) 
No expected 
signal 
Leverage LEV – Total liabilities divided (WS03351) by common equity 
(WS03501) 
Positive 
Sector SECTOR – Dummy variable based on whether the firm belongs to 
sector 1, 2 or others regarding SIC code classification (WS07021) 
Positive 
Legal status QUALITY – Governance indicator of the regulatory quality (Kaufmann et al., 2011) 
Positive 
Finally, Sector (SECTOR) relates to SIC code classification (two-digit division), 
namely: sector 1 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining (01-14), sector 2 – 
manufacturing (20-39), and other sectors. The legal status (QUALITY) is measured by 
worldwide governance indicators devised by Kaufmann et al. (2011). The indicators 
that are more suitable for measuring this variable are rule of law12 and regulatory 
                                                          12 “Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2011:223). 
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quality13. Recently, Lindahl and Schadéwitz (2013) questioned the relevance of the law 
variable in financial reporting practices used by La Porta et al. (1998). Because of this 
reason, the present study has selected the regulatory quality indicator as a proxy for the 
country-level variable. Moreover and consistently with the previous chapter, this is the 
only variable included in the present study related to a country approach. 
3.4. Methodology 
In order to explore probable relations between measurement practices and firm and 
country-level determinants, this study examines measurement practices adopted by 
listed firms that have biological assets in 2012. Data were collected in DataStream. 
Firstly, and as mentioned before, were selected countries that adopted IFRS until 2011 
to avoid examining data of the year of adoption. Then, considering the corresponding 
selection of countries, firms that have biological assets were selected. The criterion was 
to follow one of the biological assets variables (WS18277: biological assets – net book 
value; WS18278: biological assets – gross, WS18258: biological assets – current). The 
result was 324 firms14 from 33 countries and 9 different sectors. Given the fact that the 
annual report of each firm was analysed to identify the measurement practice, fair value 
or historical cost, the biological assets represented in the consolidated statement of 
financial position and in notes to the consolidated financial statements were compared 
to the information obtained through DataStream to additionally validate the study15. 
Then, and considering that the dependent variable is binary, the study has estimated two 
equations using a logit model, whose results are shown in the next section. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. 
There is a wide range of biological assets intensity (BIO) in the selection, taking into 
account that this variable corresponds to the ratio between biological assets and total 
                                                          13 “Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2011:223). 14 The selection includes 110 firms with bearer plants that will be accounted for in accordance with IAS 16 for annual periods beginning in 2016. 15 This match has excluded 59 firms from the initial selection. Such firms, in accordance with DataStream, have biological assets, but when analysing such information in the annual report, the given amount corresponds to mineral and oil resources. 
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assets: the observed maximum is 92.60 and the minimum is excessively close zero; the 
mean is 8.86 and the median is less than 2.30. For these reasons, this seems a critical 
variable and given also the skewness of 2.62. However, the analysis excludes any 
attempt to identify and remove outliers in the case of biological assets intensity. 
Because this is the main variable to determine the number of firms in the selection, the 
decision is to maintain all firms with biological assets in order to exceed previous 
studies16. The firm size (SIZE) mean is 5.68 (median=5.58) and registers a maximum of 
7.91. With regard to regulation expertise (IFRS), mean and median are similar, with less 
than 0.79 and it varies between 0.30 and 1.04, which means that the range of the 
number of years that each firm follows IFRS stands between 2 and 11. In terms of 
potential growth (GROWTH) and leverage (LEV), one observation was removed in 
each variable because both were identified as outliers, -21.19 and -17.26, respectively. 
The average of legal status (QUALITY) is 0.88, the median is also 0.89 and this 
variable lists a maximum of 1.94. 
In terms of the measurement practice (FAIR), about 32% of the 324 listed firms 
measure biological assets at historical cost. Appendix E presents the distribution of the 
number of firms by country with the related measurement practice17. 
In terms of independent dummy variables, the following table provides, for both 
independent variables, the percentage of firms that measure biological assets at fair 
value. The majority of selected firms (87.04%) corresponds to firms that are not listed 
on any foreign stock exchange (STOCK), and 63.83% of the corresponding 282 firms 
measure biological assets at fair value. Taking into consideration the sector, 28.39% of 
selected firms relates to agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, and 78.26% of the 92 
firms measure biological assets at fair value. The frequency of the sector “Others” is 
presented in Appendix C. 
 
                                                          16 For example, Cairns et al. (2011), considering a sample of 228 firms listed in Australia and in the United Kingdom with regard to IFRS adoption in 2005, have concluded that mandatory requirements concerning IAS 41 have an insignificant impact in nationally, within country and between country comparability, which reflects the small number of firms with biological assets. 17 In Appendix E, China is the most represented country (21%). No further analysis is developed based on this finding, due to the fact that this essay has no intent to perform any analysis or interpretation by individual country. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Selection:   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Observ. 1 324 BIO 8.86 2.29 92.60 0.0(1) 14.55 2.62 321 SIZE 5.68 5.58 7.91 2.68 0.78 0.10 321 IFRS 0.73 0.78 1.04 0.30 0.21 -0.84 321 GROWTH  1.55 1.08 16.35 -3.28 1.74 3.68 321 LEV 1.28 0.88 16.09 -4.92 1.77 4.27 321 QUALITY 0.88 0.89 1.94 -0.26 0.84 -0.15 321 
          Frequency Percent Fair value (percentage) 
FAIR Fair value 220 67.90 - Historical cost 104 32.10 - 
STOCK 
Firm not listed on any foreign stock exchange 282 87.04 63.83 
Firm listed on one foreign stock exchange or multi-listing 41 12.65 95.12 
No label 1 0.31 100.00 
SECTOR 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining 92 28.39 78.26 
Manufacturing 182 56.17 60.99 
Others 50 15.44 74.00 
Table 3.4 presents Pearson’s correlation matrix between all variables. In multivariate 
analysis, it is commonly acknowledged that correlations between independent variables 
are not risky unless they exceed 0.80 or 0.90 (Gujarati, 1995). Since there are no highly 
correlated independent variables, all variables are maintained in the model.  
Table 3.4. Pearson’s correlation 
 BIO SIZE IFRS GROWTH LEV QUALITY BIO       SIZE -0.113***     IFRS  0.022*** 0.020***    GROWTH  -0.187*** 0.070*** 0.025*   LEV -0.055*** 0.166*** -0.097* 0.066***  QUALITY 0.233*** -0.014*** 0.106* -0.318*** -0.008  
Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level 
At 10% of significance level, regulation expertise is negatively correlated to leverage 
and positively correlated to legal status variable. At 5% of significance level, biological 
assets intensity is negatively correlated to firm size. Finally, the table also exhibits the 
following findings at 1% level of significance: legal status variable is positively 
correlated to biological assets intensity and negatively correlated to potential growth; 
biological assets intensity is negatively correlated to potential growth; and firm size is 
positively correlated to leverage. 
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3.5.2. Logit regression model 
The following logit regression model tests the country and firm-level determinants. 
The results are provided in table 3.5. The presence of heteroscedasticity is analysed with 
Huber and White’s general test (White, 1980).  
Fair = b0 +b1BIO +b2SIZE +b3STOCK +b4IFRS +b5GROWTH +b6LEV + 
 +b7∑j=1,2,3SECTORj +b8QUALITY +ui       (3.1) 
Firstly, table 3.5 assures the model’s feasibility by explaining the accounting choice, 
with a likelihood-ratio chi-squared significance at 0.000 and a McFadden R-squared of 
0.374. Regarding the regression coefficients, all variables are statistically and positively 
significant with two exceptions. The leverage variable is not statistically significant and 
potential growth is statistically significant, but it has a negative coefficient, meaning 
that the more the ratio between market value to book value increased, the lower the logit 
for fair value measurement for biological assets. 
Given the transformation of regression coefficients (odds ratio), this study interprets 
the effect that independent variables have on the probability of fair value measurement 
for biological assets.  
For dummy independent variables, results are as follows: since listing status 
(STOCK) denotes 1 whether the firm is listed on one foreign stock exchange or multi-
listed, or 0 otherwise, an odds ratio equal to 15.370 estimates that fair value 
measurement for biological assets is more than 15 times as likely to occur among firms 
that are listed on one foreign stock exchange or multi-listed than the other selected 
firms. This finding is consistent with Daniel et al. (2010) regarding non-financial assets, 
and with Taplin et al. (2014) in terms of investment property. 
Additionally, for sector (SECTOR), the corresponding odds ratio equal to 1.914 
estimates that fair value measurement for biological assets is more than 1.9 times as 
likely to occur among firms that belong to the agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and 
manufacturing sectors than firms that belong to other sectors. Similar to this finding, 
Demaria and Dufour (2007) confirm that the financial sector is linked to IFRS choices 
in the French context. 
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Table 3.5. Logit regression model 
Equation: (3.1)   Selection: 1 324   Included observations: 319 after adjustments  Dependent variable:  FAIR   Standard errors & covariance: QML (Huber/White)  Variable odds ratio coefficient z-statistic 
Constant 0.003 -5.875*** -4.027*** 
BIO 1.082 0.079*** 2.832*** 
SIZE 1.698 0.530*** 2.608*** 
STOCK 15.370 2.732*** 2.968*** 
IFRS 19.735 2.982*** 3.833*** 
GROWTH 0.805 -0.217*** -1.938*** 
LEV 1.091 0.087*** 0.903*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 1.914 0.649*** 1.767*** 
QUALITY 3.911 1.364*** 6.366*** 
McFadden R-squared   0.374***   
Log likelihood  -126.081***  Restr. log likelihood  -201.392***  LR statistic  150.622***  Obs with Dep=0  104
***  Obs with Dep=1  215
***  Total obs  319***  Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
For continuous variables, and starting by firm size (SIZE), the odds ratio is 1.698. 
Thus, for each unit increase in the logarithm of total assets (expressed in Eur’000) the 
odds of choosing fair value increases by 69.80%. In this case, in order to interpret the 
odds ratio (because the variable is expressed in logarithm form), it is possible to explain 
the specific effect of a unit increasing in SIZE considering the range of the variable in 
the study selection. For instance, an increase in firm size from 5 to 6 (expressed in 
logarithm of total assets) means that an increase of (e6-e5) x 1.000=255.016 euros 
increases the odds of choosing fair value by 69.80%. These results are also supported by 
Cairns et al. (2011) for biological assets. 
For other continuous variables, one unit variation in each variable does not clearly 
explain the impact on fair value choice. Therefore, the odds ratio was transformed 
taking into consideration a change of 0.10 (10%).  
Biological assets intensity (BIO) varies widely between almost 0 and 92.60. The 
odds ratio was transformed at e0.079 =1.082, taking into consideration a change of 0.10 
(10%) in the variable instead of a unit change. Because e0.079/10 = 1.008, this means that 
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the odds of choosing fair value for biological assets are multiplied by 1.008 for each 
additional 10% variation in BIO. Hence, for each 10% increase in BIO, there is a 0.8% 
increase in the odds of fair value choice. This finding is consistent with Daniel et al. 
(2010) regarding non-financial assets, and with Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) and 
Hlaing and Pourjalali (2012) in terms of investment property. 
The regulation expertise (IFRS) variable ranges from 0.30 to 1.04. Again, instead of 
considering the odds ratio at 19.735 (e2.982), it is interpreted as e2.982/10 = 1.347. For each 
10% increase in regulation expertise, there is a 35% increase in the odds of fair value 
choice. This finding is consistent with Daniel et al. (2010) regarding non-financial 
assets. 
Potential growth (GROWTH) ranges from -3.28 to 16.35 in the study selection. In 
order to calculate the impact on the fair value choice, the odds ratio e-0.217 =0.805 was 
transformed, taking into consideration a change of 0.10 (10%) in the variable instead of 
a unit change. In this case, e-0.217/10 = 0.978 means that the odds of choosing fair value 
for biological assets is multiplied by 0.98 for each additional 10% variation in 
GROWTH. In other words, the odds of choosing fair value are reduced by (1-0.98) X 
100 = 2% for each 10% increase in potential growth. Missonier-Piera (2007) has also 
concluded that fixed-asset revaluation in Switzerland is negatively influenced by growth 
opportunities.  
The legal status (QUALITY) varies between -0.26 to 1.94. Because the odds ratio 
equal to 3.911 (e1.364), it is interpreted as e1.364/10 = 1.146. For each 10% increase in 
regulatory quality, there is a 15% increase in the odds of fair value choice.  
Finally, the results show that there is no relationship with leverage variable. 
Regarding investment property, Taplin et al. (2014) have found insignificant evidence 
to support leverage. Also, Demaria and Dufour (2007) confirm that leverage is not 
linked to IFRS choices in French context. 
Taking into account that regulation expertise is statistically and positively significant 
at less than 0.01 in equation (3.1), the study has introduced the combination between 
this variable and the sector, improving the effect of the firms with higher regulation 
expertise that belong to the following sectors: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and 
manufacturing.  
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In this sense the model includes a second equation (3.2) and the results are provided 
in table 3.6. The new variable is also statistically and positively significant; moreover, 
the equation has improved the McFadden R-squared measure.  
Fair = b0 +b1BIO +b2SIZE +b3 STOCK +b4 IFRS +b5GROWTH +b6LEV + 
 +b7IFRS x ∑ j=1,2,3 SECTORj +b8QUALITY +ui     (3.2) 
In order to provide some robustness tests, three additional analyses were conducted. 
Firstly, Appendix G and Appendix H present, respectively, the correct prediction for the 
dependent variable and the Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic to test the overall 
model (Hosmer et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2002; Stone and Rasp, 1991). 
Table 3.6. Logit regression model – crossed effect of regulation expertise and sector 
Equation: (3.2)  Selection: 1 324  Included observations: 319 after adjustments 
Dependent variable:  FAIR  Standard errors & covariance: QML (Huber/White) 
Variable odds ratio coefficient z-statistic 
Constant 0.003 -5.868 -4.067*** 
BIO 1.083 0.079 2.842*** 
SIZE 1.739 0.553 2.716*** 
STOCK 15.792 2.759 2.961*** 
IFRS 15.577 2.746 3.460*** 
GROWTH 0.801 -0.222 -2.074*** 
LEV 1.087 0.083 0.851*** 
IFRS*(SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1) 3.226 1.171 2.432*** 
QUALITY 3.924 1.367 6.338*** 
McFadden R-squared   0.378***   
Log likelihood  -125.277***  Restr. log likelihood  -201.392***  LR statistic  152.230***  Obs with Dep=0 104 
Obs with Dep=1 215 
Total obs   319   Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
According to Appendix G, the logit model correctly identifies 72 percent of firms 
that measure biological assets at historical cost (specificity) and 90 percent of firms that 
measure biological assets at fair value (sensitivity). In appendix H, Andrews’s statistic 
is statistically significant in both equations at 1% level and Hosmer-Lemeshow’s 
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statistic is statistically significant in equation (3.1) at a 10% level and in equation (3.2) 
at a 5% level. 
Secondly and in order to include another proxy to test country-level factor, in 
accordance with the previous chapter, the model included the cluster classification 
(Leuz, 2010) using regulatory and reporting practice variables. Table 3.7 supports that 
the results remain the same for both equations. This means that fair value measurement 
for biological assets is more likely to occur among firms that belong to cluster 1 
(outsider economies) than other selected firms.  
Table 3.7. Robustness test – legal status variable: cluster 
Equation: (3.1)  (3.2)   Variable odds ratio coefficient z-statistic odds ratio coefficient z-statistic Constant 0.031 -3.475 -2.509*** 0.033 -3.413 -2.552*** 
BIO 1.083 0.080 2.986*** 1.085 0.082 2.969*** 
SIZE 1.713 0.538 2.269*** 1.765 0.568 2.441*** 
STOCK 12.988 2.564 2.408*** 13.874 2.630 2.395*** 
IFRS 8.134 2.096 2.571*** 5.669 1.735 2.062*** 
GROWTH 0.539 -0.618 -3.539*** 0.531 -0.633 -3.643*** 
LEV 1.016 0.016 0.169*** 1.015 0.015 0.149*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 2.347 0.853 2.027***    IFRS* (SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1)    4.627 1.532 2.625*** CLUSTER1=1 53.517 3.980 2.349*** 55.980 4.025 2.361*** 
CLUSTER2=1 0.306 -1.184 -2.779*** 0.303 -1.195 -2.770*** 
McFadden R-squared   0.459***    0.465***   
Log likelihood  -106.234***   -105.161***  Restr. log likelihood  -196.382***   -196.382***  LR statistic  180.296***   182.442***  Obs with Dep=0 102  102  Obs with Dep=1 208  208  Total obs   310    310   Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Repeating this analysis with the classic country classification, namely, common law 
and code law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), once more, fair value measurement for 
biological assets is more likely to occur among firms that belong to common law 
countries than other selected firms. However, the regulation expertise variable loses 
statistical significance as documented in table 3.8; therefore, the combination between 
regulation expertise and sector was not tested. 
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Table 3.8. Robustness test – legal status variable: legal 
Equation: (3.1)   
Variable odds ratio coefficient z-statistic Constant 0.036 -3.338 -2.170*** 
BIO 1.074 0.071 2.619*** 
SIZE 1.647 0.499 2.210*** 
STOCK 11.681 2.458 2.414*** 
IFRS 3.384 1.219 1.310*** 
GROWTH 0.500 -0.693 -3.472*** 
LEV 1.038 0.037 0.372*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 2.656 0.977 2.381*** 
LEGAL 154.316 5.039 2.808*** 
McFadden R-squared  0.437***   
Log likelihood  -102.899***  
Restr. log likelihood  -182.902***  
LR statistic  160.007***  
Obs with Dep=0  90  Obs with Dep=1  209  Total obs  299   Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Thirdly, given the results related to sector, firms that belong to agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, mining and manufacturing sectors denote higher probability to choose fair value 
for measuring their biological assets. With the purpose of assuring a more detailed 
analysis and ascertaining different behaviour according to sector, the model was re-
estimated splitting the sectors. Table 3.9 shows that agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
mining sectors are statistically and positive significant (odds ratio of 1.914, equation 
(3.1) and 3.226, equation (3.2)) and manufacturing sector is statistically and negative 
significant18 (odds ratio of 0.480, equation (3.1) and 0.363, equation (3.2)).  
Moreover, in order to identify which subsectors that belong to agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and mining sectors and to manufacturing sector are responsible for these results, 
another analysis was performed. A 2-digit sic-code division was considered according 
to agricultural and manufacturing subsectors that exhibit more number of firms to avoid 
any biased results, as presented in table 3.10. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 
sectors are divided in three subsectors, namely: agricultural production – crops (sic-
code 01), agricultural production – livestock and animals specialties (sic-code 02) and 
others. Manufacturing sector is divided in three subsectors, namely, food and kindred 
                                                          18 An odds ratio less than 1 corresponds to a negative coefficient, as previously explained. 
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products (sic-code 20), paper and allied products (sic-code 26) and others. Subsector 
food and kindred products includes 29 firms in the subsector beverages (sic-code 208).  
Table 3.9. Robustness test – sector: agriculture versus manufacturing 
Equation: (3.1)  (3.2)  Variable odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
Constant 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
BIO 1.082*** 1.085*** 1.083*** 1.087*** 
SIZE 1.699*** 1.644*** 1.739*** 1.668*** 
STOCK 15.364*** 15.211*** 15.792*** 15.532*** 
IFRS 19.727*** 22.669*** 15.577*** 40.476*** 
GROWTH 0.805*** 0.811*** 0.801*** 0.812*** 
LEV 1.091*** 1.100*** 1.087*** 1.090*** 
SECTOR1=1 1.914***    
SECTOR2=1  0.480***   
IFRS*SECTOR1=1   3.226***  
IFRS*SECTOR2=1    0.363*** 
QUALITY 3.912*** 3.827*** 3.924*** 3.868*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.374*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 
Log likelihood -126.081*** -124.976*** -125.277*** -125.142*** 
Restr. log likelihood -201.392*** -201.392*** -201.392*** -201.392*** 
LR statistic 150.622*** 152.832*** 152.230*** 152.500*** 
Obs with Dep=0 104 104 104 104 
Obs with Dep=1 215 215 215 215 
Total obs 319 319 319 319 Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Table 3.10. Selection distribution 
SIC code classification (2-digit) Nr. Firms 
01 - Agricultural Production – Crops 34 
02 - Agricultural Production – Livestock and Animal Specialties 27 
Others 31 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining 92 
20 - Food and Kindred Products (includes 29 firms in the subsector Beverages) 98 
26 - Paper and Allied Products 27 
Others 57 
Manufacturing 182 
Others 50 
Total selection 324 
Firstly, regarding the agricultural sector, the model was re-estimated considering two 
subsectors – agriculture production – crops (sic-code 01) and agriculture production – 
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livestock and animal specialties (sic-code 02). When analysed individually, none of the 
sectors is statistically significant (odds ratio of 1.702, crops and 1.239, livestock and 
animal specialties). Table 3.11 shows these findings. 
Table 3.11. Robustness test – sector: agriculture 
Equation: (3.1) Crops Livestock and Animal Specialties Variable odds ratio odds ratio 
Constant 0.003*** 0.003*** 
BIO 1.083*** 1.084*** 
SIZE 1.693*** 1.676*** 
STOCK 15.292*** 15.808*** 
IFRS 19.792*** 20.039*** 
GROWTH 0.803*** 0.805*** 
LEV 1.091*** 1.093*** 
subSECTOR1.01=1 1.702***  
subSECTOR1.02=1  1.239*** 
subSECTOR1.01oth=1 2.003***  
subSECTOR1.02oth=1  2.311*** 
QUALITY 3.911*** 3.854*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.374*** 0.376*** 
Log likelihood -126.057*** -125.709*** 
Restr. log likelihood -201.392*** -201.392*** 
LR statistic 150.670*** 151.366*** 
Obs with Dep=0 104 104 
Obs with Dep=1 215 215 
Total obs 319 319 SubSECTOR1.01 Agricultural Production – Crops  SubSECTOR1.02 Agricultural Production – Livestock and Animal Specialties  Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Secondly, regarding manufacturing sector, the model was re-estimated considering 
two subsectors – paper and allied products (sic-code 26) and food and kindred products 
(sic-code 20). Although paper and allied products subsector is not statistically 
significant (odds ratio of 0.912), food and kindred products subsector is statistically and 
negative significant (odds ratio of 0.367). Therefore, and in order to assure a more 
bounded analysis, a 3 digit sic-code division was considered and it was identified 
beverages subsector (sic-code 208) as responsible for negative results (odds ratio of 
0.139). A plausible explanation could be the fact that this subsector represents the firms 
that have bearer biological assets, which are more complex to measure due to lacking of 
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active markets, and therefore have a higher propensity to follow the unreliability clause 
of fair value. Table 3.12 supports these results. 
Table 3.12. Robustness test – sector: manufacturing 
Equation: (3.1) Paper and Allied Products Food and Kindred Products Beverages Variable odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
Constant 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
BIO 1.082*** 1.084*** 1.089*** 
SIZE 1.575*** 1.580*** 1.569*** 
STOCK 15.684*** 15.172*** 16.496*** 
IFRS 23.314*** 24.909*** 25.647*** 
GROWTH 0.823*** 0.822*** 0.829*** 
LEV 1.088*** 1.101*** 1.078*** 
subSECTOR2.26=1 0.912***   
subSECTOR2.20=1  0.367***  
subSECTOR2.208=1   0.139*** 
subSECTOR2.26oth=1 0.441***   
subSECTOR2.20oth=1  0.704***  
subSECTOR2.208oth=1   0.654*** 
QUALITY 3.853*** 3.904*** 4.510*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.382*** 0.385*** 0.400*** 
Log likelihood -124.335*** -123.788*** -120.817*** 
Restr. log likelihood -201.392*** -201.392*** -201.392*** 
LR statistic 154.115*** 155.208*** 161.150*** 
Obs with Dep=0 104 104 104 
Obs with Dep=1 215 215 215 
Total obs 319 319 319 SubSECTOR2.26 Paper and Allied Products  SubSECTOR2.20 Food and Kindred Products  SubSECTOR2.208 Beverages Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
In the overall, only firms that belong to agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 
sectors denote higher probability to choose fair value for measuring biological assets. 
3.6. Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research 
This chapter analyses measurement practices of 324 firms worldwide that adopted 
IFRS until 2011. As a main rule, IAS 41 requires biological assets to be measured at fair 
value less costs to sell. Ideally, firms that use the unreliability clause of fair value 
should correspond to firms that are unable to report biological assets at fair value. This 
unpretentious interpretation is explored in this study. Based on the literature and given 
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the obtained results, this study concludes that there are other reasons related to firm and 
country environment that could explain this behaviour. Firstly, and considering the 
agency and accounting choice theories, the suggested firm-level determinants, 
biological assets intensity, firm size, to be listed in one or more than one foreign stock 
exchange, regulation expertise and to belong to agricultural or manufacturing sectors 
have a significant positive impact on the probability of fair value measurement for 
biological assets. In particular, regarding sector, agriculture and manufacturing exhibit a 
different behaviour. Firms that belong to manufacturing sector tend to choose in a lesser 
extent the fair value to measure biological assets. Additionally, potential growth has a 
significant negative impact on fair value measurement practice. Moreover, the results do 
not corroborate the theoretical background related to leverage. Secondly, based on the 
contingency theory, results corroborate the country-level hypothesis. Firms that belong 
to more developed countries, according to governance indicators (Kaufmann et al., 
2011) are more likely to use fair value measurement model, avoiding use of the 
unreliability clause. The study highlights the positive and combined impact between 
regulation expertise and sector with fair value measurement for biological assets. 
This essay has some limitations. Firstly, this study focuses on the impact of specific 
firm determinants over measurement practices, but there are maybe other relevant 
variables to consider, such as profitability and ownership concentration. Secondly, one 
cannot guarantee that results would hold when using different firm and country 
classifications that the ones applied in this study.  
Regarding future research on this area, other links could be explored, such as the 
relationship between measurement and disclosure practices. Furthermore, it could be 
analysed how the impact of environmental regulations at the country-level influences 
firms’ incentives to adopt fair value with respect to IAS 41. 
In spite of these constraints, this research provides important contributions to the 
literature in this area: this essay has extended studies to a worldwide selection, assuring 
that a larger number of countries and determinants with recent data are included. Given 
the recent review process of IAS 41, this study raises awareness of standard setters 
concerning the limitations of measurement practices of biological assets. Overall, all 
other stakeholders benefit from this essay because they will be better informed about 
measurement practices and its determinants. 
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under IAS 41 
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4.1. Introduction 
Fair value relevance is a widely discussed issue in the literature (Mala and Chand, 
2012; Laux and Leuz, 2010; Hitz, 2007; Ball, 2006; Cairns, 2006; Barlev and Haddad, 
2003; Barth et al., 2001; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Even though fair value is 
responsible for the volatility of results and for stimulating some managerial discretion, it 
also incorporates more information into financial statements. Given the previous 
chapters, where disclosure and measurement matters were examined, in order to explore 
investors’ perception of this additional information, it is important to differentiate 
recognition and disclosure (Kun, 2013; Ahmed et al., 2006; Ball, 2006; Davis-Friday et 
al., 1999). In particular, to recognise an amount and to disclose an amount, both are 
means to assure the decision-usefulness of financial statement information (Badenhorst 
et al., 2015). 
In general and according to Choudhary (2011), recognised values settled by managers 
and revised by auditors have different requirements when compared to disclosed values; 
consequently, investors value recognised values more than disclosed ones. This is 
especially useful for standard-setters in order to decide upon recognition and disclosure. 
According to Al Jifri and Citron (2009) the empirical evidence on the value relevance of 
disclosure is diversified and actually accounting regulators tend to elect recognition 
over disclosure.  
The academic research and the intense debate regarding fair value is frequently 
concerned with financial instruments, but IAS 41 requirements of fair valuation bring 
this discussion into agricultural context (Argilés et al., 2011). In particular, “IAS 41 is a 
“true” fair value standard: the fair value of biological assets is reported on the firm’s 
balance sheet and any change in the fair value of the biological assets over the reporting 
period is recognised in periodic income as an unrealized gain or loss” (Huffman, 
2013:2). 
In fact, the introduction of fair value in agriculture for all biological assets has led 
standard setters to depart from previous accounting practices. Some evidence supports 
that fair value is more reliable in the decision-making process of agents within 
agriculture context (Argilés Bosh et al., 2012). However, the standardization assured by 
IAS 41 in this domain is not capable to mitigate the subjective process of fair valuation 
(Machado et al., 2015). In particular, the main disadvantage of fair value is the absence 
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of active markets for some biological assets. In this case, and with regard to the 
diversity of fair valuation models, it is possible for firms to use accounting for their own 
interests (Gabriel and Stefea, 2013). Moreover, Martins et al. (2012) highlight that each 
biological asset has its own attributes and life-cycles, which means that the 
corresponding valuation is more difficult to achieve. 
Based on previous considerations, this essay focuses on the following research 
questions: 
 Are biological assets at fair value value relevant under IAS 41? 
 Is there a difference in the value relevance of biological assets between listed firms 
with high and low disclosure level on biological assets? 
In order to address these questions, this study adjusts the original accounting-based 
valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995) and analyses panel data drawn from a 
worldwide selection composed of 132 firms from 27 IFRS adopting countries19 and 8 
sectors, between 2011 and 2013. Taking into consideration previous studies, this essay 
presents extensive research based on a considerable number of countries with recent 
data concerning a standard that was recently under discussion. 
The study is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a literature review, firstly by 
focusing on the debate of fair value relevance under international financial reporting, 
and then applied to non-financial assets and biological assets in particular. Section 4.3 
introduces the hypotheses and explains the disclosure index. Section 4.4 describes the 
methodology, presents the selection and the research model. Section 4.5 discusses the 
findings of the empirical analysis. Lastly, the final section provides a brief conclusion. 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. Fair value relevance under international financial reporting 
In general, value relevance research infers about how accounting information is 
reflected in the share prices and influences investors’ decision-making (Barth et al., 
2001). Furthermore and in response to the comment of Holthausen and Watts (2001:3), 
supporting that “the value-relevance literature’s reported associations between 
                                                          19 The countries are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 
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accounting numbers and common equity valuations have limited implications or 
inferences for standard setting”, Barth et al. (2001) argue that the incorporated financial 
data in accounting records reflect relevant information not only for investors but also for 
accounting regulators and all stakeholders of the firm. 
In fact, incorporating more information into financial statements seems to be the most 
important advantage of fair value accounting according to several authors (Mala and 
Chand, 2012; Ball, 2006; Barlev and Haddad, 2003; Barth et al., 2001). In particular, 
fair value covers more information than historical cost whenever there is either an 
observable market price that managers cannot adjust or an independently observable 
and reliable estimate of market price (Ball, 2006). 
The increase of up-to-date and relevant information with higher level of transparency 
improves investor self-reliance in capital markets. Fair value represents the amount that 
an asset can be bought or sold and assures more information related to the 
corresponding risk. As a consequence, investors can implement higher market controls 
and actively react accordingly to firms’ decisions (Mala and Chand, 2012). Ideally, 
better financial information induces some potential benefits for investors, such as 
reduced risks and reduced cost of capital.  
Moreover, Cairns (2006:21) argues that “those who criticise the limited use of fair 
values in IFRS should question their application of national GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) and whether previous financial statements really had the 
qualities they claimed”. Nonetheless, there are also some well-known disadvantages 
related to fair value accounting. 
The recognised fair value changes in capital or in profit and loss are responsible for 
the higher volatility of reported results, hiding the value creation process (Mala and 
Chand, 2012). Even though volatility becomes a disadvantage to investors if it 
represents managerial discretion, Ball (2006) also defends that volatility should not be a 
problem whenever it reproduces timely incorporation of new information in earnings. 
Some authors go further in the criticism by supporting that fair value accounting may 
have been responsible for the recent financial crisis. Laux and Leuz (2010) argue that 
because fair value-based models may not be reliable, fair value accounting may have 
contributed to the procyclicality of financial system, exacerbating inherent fluctuations 
and, in severe cases, causing a downward spiral in financial markets. 
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Furthermore, when a liquid market price is not available, “mark to market” 
accounting leads to “mark to model” accounting, with several valuation models, such as 
the present value (discounted cash flow) method and the methods adapted from the 
original Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973). These fair value models are 
based on specific parameters and assumptions that could lead to management 
manipulation (Mala and Chand, 2012; Hitz, 2007; Ball, 2006). In fact, given fair value 
measurement, Fargher and Zhang (2014) state that when accounting standards allow 
managerial discretion, this opportunity is unscrupulously used by managers in practice 
and will compromise the relevance of financial reporting. Therefore, if users of 
financial information consider untrustworthy the corresponding information, they will 
not value this information as meaningful (Fargher and Zhang, 2014). Even though a 
liquid market price is able to reduce the opportunity for discretion by managers, Ball 
(2006) highlights that market liquidity could also lead to another problem, when the 
spreads are higher enough to raise uncertainty about fair value in financial statements. 
For non-financial assets, such as investment property and biological assets, 
sometimes a market price is not available, which makes fair value assessment more 
difficult. Fair value relevance of non-financial assets and biological assets, in particular, 
will be explained in the next subsection. 
4.2.2. Fair value relevance of non-financial assets 
Considering biological assets, Lefter and Roman (2007) argue that the transformation 
process is directly reflected in financial reporting and consequently investors have the 
opportunity to calculate the future economic profit. There are some papers that discuss 
the impact of accounting information on the investors’ decision-making, where 
biological assets are concerned. The results are not consensual (Huffman, 2013; 
Machado et al., 2013; Silva Filho et al., 2013; Argilés et al., 2012; Martins et al. 2012; 
Argilés et al., 2011). 
Given a sample of 45 firms of European countries, in 2008, Martins et al. (2012) have 
concluded that fair value accounting is recognised as not relevant in biological assets 
domain in terms of the impact that accounting information has on the investors’ 
decision-making. They are more interested in firms’ financial performance as a whole. 
Conversely, by leading an experiment with students, farmers and accountants engaged 
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with the agricultural sector in Spain, Argilés Bosh et al. (2012) have matched the 
constraints that arise from measuring both valuation methods for biological assets, 
historical cost and fair value. The findings suggest that fair value is more reliable in the 
decision-making process of agents in the agricultural sector. Moreover, fair value seems 
to be more suitable for accounting preparation than historical cost. Furthermore, Argilés 
et al. (2011) have suggested that less reliable measurement under fair value would be 
expected, since market prices reflect significant variations in the agricultural sector. 
Based on 347 Spanish firms from 1995 to 2006, and given the importance of random 
factors derived from climate and market conditions in agriculture, the empirical 
evidence supports no difference in the relevance of accounting information from both 
valuation methods, in the sense that fair value is not responsible for higher 
unpredictability and volatility for future earnings and cash flows. 
Based on 25 listed firms from Brazil, for 2008 and 2009, Machado et al. (2013) have 
concluded that replacing historical cost with fair value for biological assets 
measurement was not relevant to accounting information users. Conversely, Silva Filho 
et al. (2013) support that both historical cost and fair value measurements of biological 
assets are relevant to Brazilian capital market. Additionally, it is noteworthy that 
replacing historical cost with fair value, when measuring such assets, is beneficial to 
market, from an informational point of view, since the difference between the estimated 
market value and accounting numbers were lower when compared to the measurement 
at historical cost.  
Finally, in contrast to previous academic discussion concerning asset measurement, 
which focuses exclusively on fair value or historical cost, Huffman (2013) has 
examined whether asset measurement related to asset use assures more value relevant 
information to investors. Regarding generated value, an asset can be classified as an in-
exchange asset, which represents a consumable biological asset (for example, a 
plantation to produce timber logs) or as an in-use asset, which represents a bearer 
biological asset (for example, a plantation to produce palm oil). Previously, Littleton 
(1935) has stated that the information is more relevant for investors if fair value is 
applied to in-exchange assets and historical cost is applied to in-use assets. Based on a 
sample of 183 international firms from 35 countries that adopt IAS 41, in 1999-2001 
and 2007-2010, Huffman (2013) has concluded that book value and earnings 
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information is more value relevant when consumable biological assets are measured at 
fair value and bearer biological assets are measured at historical cost. 
Because there are few studies on fair value accounting concerning biological assets 
measurement and the scope of the studies is narrow, generally focusing on comparison 
between historical cost and fair value, this essay has also relied on literature where this 
topic is discussed for other non-financial assets (Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2014; 
Hamberg and Beisland, 2014; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2010; 
Lourenço and Curto, 2008; Barth and Clinch, 1998), such as goodwill, investment 
property, research and development (R&D) expenditure, tangible and intangible assets. 
Table 4.1 summarises the analysed papers. In order to test market valuation 
implications, all papers have the applied methodology in common, an adaptation of the 
Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995), further explained in section 4.4 (with the exception of 
Hamberg and Beisland (2014), which adopts a typical return model). Overall, non-
financial assets measured at fair value are value relevant, and sometimes this evidence 
occurs independently of the country classification (common law or code law). Some 
papers suggest that corresponding mandatory disclosure is also a disciplinary element of 
the market’s perception. Moreover, in the absence of a market price, usually, managers 
act in self-interest. 
4.3. Development of hypotheses 
Based on previous studies, this essay focuses on the following two research 
questions: 
 Are biological assets at fair value value relevant under IAS 41? 
 Is there a difference in the value relevance of biological assets between listed firms 
with high and low disclosure level on biological assets? 
This study tests the value relevance of recognised biological assets, which is 
explored under the theory of asymmetric information (Glaum et al., 2013; Hitz, 2007; 
Healy and Papelu, 2001). 
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Table 4.1. Literature review 
Paper Assets Selection Hypotheses Main conclusions 
Baboukardos 
and Rimmel 
(2014) 
Goodwill 76 firms 
Greece 
2014 
H1: Purchased goodwill under IFRS is value 
relevant. 
H2: There is a difference in goodwill’s value 
relevance between firms with high and low 
disclosure level compliance under IFRS. 
Fair value measurement of goodwill under IFRS assures 
relevant information in Greece (code law country). 
For firms with high (low) disclosure compliance under 
IFRS, goodwill has a strong effect (no effect) on the 
equities’ market valuation. 
Hamberg and 
Beisland 
(2014) 
Goodwill 2052 firm year 
observations 
Sweden 
2001-2010 
H1: Goodwill amortizations determined under 
Swedish GAAP are not value relevant. 
H2: Value relevance of goodwill impairments 
determined under Swedish GAAP differs from 
value relevance of goodwill impairments settled 
under IFRS 3 – Business Combinations. 
Goodwill amortizations are not associated with stock 
returns.  
Conversely the period before IFRS adoption, impairments 
are no longer statistically related under IFRS 3 (impairment 
is perceived as a decreased value by market participants 
when it occurs in addition to amortizations and managers 
are motivated to prevent the impairment of goodwill). 
Tsoligkas and 
Tsalavoutas 
(2011) 
R&D 
expenditure 
418 firm year 
observations 
United Kingdom  
2005-2007 
H1: Capitalised and expensed R&D expenditure 
are value relevant in the United Kingdom, after 
2005. 
H2: There are different valuation effects of R&D 
reporting between large and small firms in the 
United Kingdom, after 2005. 
There is a positive (negative) and significant association 
between capitalised (expensed) R&D and market values. 
R&D expenses are negatively value relevant only for large 
firms (informing investors on whether the research 
expenditure indicates expenses on no successful projects 
that will not assure future benefits to firms).  
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Paper Assets Selection Hypotheses Main conclusions 
Oliveira et al. 
(2010) 
Goodwill and 
intangible 
assets 
354 firm year 
observations 
Portugal 
1998-2008 
H1: Intangible assets are value relevant. 
H2: Value relevance of book value, earnings and 
recognised intangible assets under IFRS differs 
from value relevance of accounting information 
under Portuguese GAAP. 
Intangible assets are associated with stock price.  
IFRS adoption had no impact on the value relevance of 
identifiable intangibles and a positive effect on the value 
relevance of goodwill. Value relevance of earnings has 
weakened after 2005, once accounting policy has changed. 
Lourenço and 
Curto (2008) 
Investment 
property 
224 firms 
European 
countries  
2005-2007 
H1: Cost, fair value and disclosed fair value of 
investment property are priced differently by 
investors. 
H2: Fair value of investment property in France, 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 
priced by investors differently from each other. 
Investors differentiate cost and fair value and disclosed fair 
value of investment property. 
Investors do not differentiate valuation implications of fair 
value in Germany, the United Kingdom (Continental and 
Anglo-Saxon models, respectively), France and Sweden 
(countries with medium level of shareholder protection). 
Barth and 
Clinch (1998) 
Tangible and 
intangible 
assets 
250 firms 
Australia  
1991-1995 
Relevance, reliability, and timeliness of Australian 
asset revaluations differ: 
H1: Across different types of assets. 
H2: If revaluation is determined by the firm's 
director or an independent appraiser. 
H3: According the age of the revalued amount. 
Upward and downward revalued tangible and intangible 
assets are value relevant. 
Little evidence supports that director-based revalued 
amounts are less relevant than independent appraiser-based 
revalued amounts. 
Timeliness is not sensitive to long-term asset revaluations. 
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The research model includes the market value per share (MV) as the dependent 
variable that corresponds to the market price month close (three months after the fiscal 
year20) and explores several determinants that are expected to be related to, namely, 
book value per share, biological assets per share, earnings per share, disclosure index 
ranking regarding IAS 41 and control variables, firm size and sector. 
In the overall, financial statements are not effective in decreasing information 
asymmetries, if financial reporting is tendentiously partial and not complete (Glaum et 
al., 2013). The first research question examines the ability of biological assets to 
explain market equity values. Where decision usefulness is concerned, measurement 
undertakes an important role (Hitz, 2007), once timely information mitigates the risk of 
investors’ valuation (Glaum et al., 2013). 
Although there are studies that confirm accounting information related to biological 
assets has impact on investors’ decision-making (Silva Filho et al., 2013; Argilés Bosh 
et al., 2012; Argilés et al., 2011), there are other studies that do not support value 
relevance in biological assets domain (Machado et al., 2013; Martins et al., 2012). On 
one hand, given the informational point of view, the replacement of historical cost to 
fair value in measurement of such assets was favorable to market, since difference 
between estimated market at fair value and accounting numbers was lower compared to 
measurement at historical cost. On the other hand, it seems that investors do not take 
into account this information in isolation when making decisions about their 
investments. Moreover, often fair value of biological assets is calculated on the basis of 
estimates, mainly through the discounted future cash flow. Therefore, measurement 
becomes more difficult to be understood and may be less relevant to accounting 
information users. 
Finally, and in spite of the literature supports value relevance regarding other non-
financial assets, because of mixed empirical evidence in prior literature concerning 
biological assets, there is no strong expectation regarding the sign of the first 
hypothesis: 
                                                          20 Because the fiscal year end diverges between selected firms (31st March, 30th April, 31st May, 30th June, 31st August, 30th September, 30th November and 31st December, according to WS05350 – date of fiscal year end), the market value per share (MV) variable was settled according to these dates (WS05040 – June, WS05045 – July, WS05050 – August, WS05055 – September, WS05065 – November, WS05070 – December, WS05020 – February and WS05025 – March). For example, WS05040 – market price June close corresponds to market value per share three months after fiscal year end on 31st March. 
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H1: Biological assets at fair value are value relevant under IAS 41. 
In order to explore investors’ perception on the incorporation of more information 
into financial statements, it is essential to distinguish recognition from disclosure (Kun, 
2013; Ahmed et al., 2006; Ball, 2006; Davis-Friday et al., 1999). Additionally, “the 
question as to whether amounts disclosed in the notes of financial statements and those 
recognised on the face of the financial statements have a similar impact on share prices 
is an important one for accounting regulators, accounts preparers and auditors” (Al Jifri 
and Citron, 2009:137).  
Given IASB conceptual framework, disclosure is not a substitute for recognition. To 
be recognised an item must have “a cost or value that can be measured with reliability” 
(paragraph no. 4.38.b), IASB Conceptual Framework). The same criteria are not applied 
for disclosed items. In this sense and by analogy to the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) investors distinguish recognised items as more reliable than disclosed 
items (Fried, 2012). Nonetheless, Choudhary (2011) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) 
support that recognition suggest less reliability, since managers are more encouraged to 
manipulate recognised items than disclosed items. There are also other arguments that 
support the difference between both, such as: investors incorrectly underestimate 
disclosed items through lack of expertise or due to the cost of processing information 
(Kun, 2013; Al Jifri and Citron, 2009). Conversely, the efficient market hypothesis 
suggests that recognition enhances little when disclosure notes answers the investors’ 
information (Barth et al., 2003). 
In this extent, this current and controversial discussion justifies the introduction of 
the disclosure level effect in the present study. There is also the purpose of exceeding 
previous value relevance studies that deals only with recognition of biological assets 
(Huffman, 2013). In particular, disclosure mitigates information asymmetries in capital 
markets and reduces the cost of capital (Glaum et al., 2013; Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Regarding other non-financial assets, such as, human capital and in line with the United 
States based studies, Samudhram et al. (2014) have concluded that voluntarily disclosed 
employee costs in annual reports of listed firms are value relevant in Malaysia. 
However, such information should be inferred with caution, once it could suggest an 
alternative for managers to exercise a discretionary behaviour in respect with disclosed 
human capital based (Samudhram et al., 2014). According to Tsalavoutas and 
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Dionysiou (2014) higher voluntary disclosure level supports positive valuation 
implications. Nonetheless, prior literature does not indicate any sign for the relationship 
between mandatory disclosure compliance and market valuation. For example, Leuz 
and Wysocki (2008:17) explain that “disclosure requirements specify which information 
a firm has to provide and force it to reveal this information in both good and bad times.”  
Transposing to biological assets context, as mentioned before, PwC (2011 and 2009) 
have also advised firms to perform some voluntary disclosure of biological assets as an 
improvement to mandatory disclosure. Bearing in mind the timber sector, the PwC 
(2011 and 2009) have concluded that firms have different levels of transparency 
concerning biological assets disclosure, and in certain cases, without discussing fair 
valuation assumptions, so there is a chance for further enhancement. In addition and 
taking into account the empirical evidence of the survey developed by Elad and 
Herbohn (2011), there is a lack of comparability between disclosure practices, in which 
French firms tend to disclose less information on biological assets than firms from 
Australia and the United Kingdom. Given this diversified behaviour regarding the 
disclosure level of biological assets, as documented in chapter 2, a different impact on 
market valuation can be predicted. Additionally, and regarding other non-financial 
assets, Baboukardos and Rimmel (2014) support value relevance of goodwill only in 
firms with high disclosure level.  
The above considerations indicate an expected positive sign for the relation. 
H2: Value relevance of biological assets is higher in listed firms with high disclosure 
level on biological assets. 
The hypotheses, proxies and expected signals of independent variables introduced 
above are described in table 4.2. Data were collected in DataStream and in annual 
reports of firms between 2011 and 2013. 
The book value per share (BV) is the proportioned common equity divided by 
outstanding shares at firm's fiscal year end. Biological assets per share (BA) 
corresponds to a ratio between biological assets and common shares outstanding. 
Earnings per share (E) represent the net income available to common equity that is used 
by the firm to calculate its earnings per share, divided by common shares outstanding.  
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Table 4.2. Hypotheses, variable proxies and expected signals 
Hypotheses Variable proxies Expected signals 
Book value per 
share 
BV – Book value divided by outstanding shares at the firm's fiscal 
year end (WS05476) 
Positive 
Biological 
assets per share 
BA – Biological assets (WS18277, WS18278 or WS18258) 
divided by common shares outstanding (WS05301) 
No expected 
signal 
Earnings per 
share 
E – Net income used by the firm to calculate its earnings per share 
(WS01751) divided by common shares outstanding (WS05301)  
Positive 
Disclosure 
index ranking 
Dindex – Dummy variable based on whether the disclosure index 
regarding biological assets of each firm is below first quartile, in 
the middle of both quartiles, or above third quartile of the 
disclosure index distribution of the selection (annual report) 
Positive 
Controls   
Firm size SIZE – Logarithm of total assets (WS02999) Positive 
Sector SECTOR – Dummy variable based on whether the firm belongs to 
sector 1, 2 or others regarding SIC code classification (WS07021) 
Positive 
Disclosure index ranking (Dindex) is a dummy variable coded 1 if disclosure index 
regarding biological assets of each firm is below first quartile, coded 2 if it stands 
between first and third quartiles, and coded 3 if it is above third quartile of disclosure 
index distribution of selection. The annual reports of each firm between 2011 and 2013 
were analysed in order to calculate the disclosure index21.  
Based on the settled disclosure index of chapter 2 and given disclosures requirements 
of IAS 41, in the present chapter the index was calculated with the notes to the 
consolidated financial statements included in annual report of those selected firms, 
between 2011 and 2013. As previously mentioned, this index is divided into three 
sections: mandatory items, non-mandatory but recommended items (both sections 
represent all disclosure items required by IAS 41) and non-mandatory and non-
recommended items (this section corresponds to voluntary information demonstrating 
that firms exceeded IAS 41 disclosure requirements). Also, the disclosure index is 
dichotomous, unweighted and adjusted for non-applicable items. Since this essay 
                                                          21As explained in the chapter 2, this examination was performed by one researcher. In order to assure robustness of the index calculation and to minimise possible coding bias, the researcher coded the information twice and any discrepancies were solved. 
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considers only firms that measure biological assets at fair value, the disclosure items of 
IAS 41 that focus on historical cost were omitted. Items selected to be included in the 
disclosure index and results are shown in the Appendix A. 
The maximum number of items in the disclosure index is 27. According to 
Commission Regulation (EU) no. 1255/2012 of 11 December 2012, IFRS 13 is applied 
when another IFRS requires or permits fair value measurement or disclosures about fair 
value measurements. Consequently, this standard sets out amendments in several 
standards, such as in IAS 41, by deleting paragraphs 47 and 48. An entity shall apply 
amendments for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013. As a result, the 
disclosure score, in particular for 2013, is 27 or 25, respectively.  
Consequently, the total score of mandatory and voluntary disclosure index for 
biological assets (Index) in a firm is: 
m
dIndex
m
i ii
 1          (4.1) 
where di = 0 or 1, as follows: di = 1 if the item is disclosed and di = 0 otherwise; m = 
maximum number of applicable items a firm may disclose. 
The control variables are firm size (SIZE) and sector (SECTOR). Prior literature 
measures firm size (SIZE) in different ways. In accordance with previous chapters, in 
this study, firm size corresponds to the logarithm of total assets. Finally, sector 
(SECTOR) relates to SIC code classification (two-digit division), namely: sector 1 – 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining (01-14), sector 2 – manufacturing (20-39), and 
other sectors. The introduction of both variables to control for any potential effects of 
certain firm characteristics is supported by literature related to value relevance of other 
non-financial assets for size (Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2014) and for sector 
(Hamberg and Beisland, 2014; Dahmash et al., 2009). 
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4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Selection 
This study includes panel data drawn from a selection of 38922 firm-year 
observations of listed firms that adopted IFRS until 2010, from 27 countries and 8 
different sectors, between 2011 and 2013. The selection contains different amounts of 
both recognised biological assets in the face of financial statements and disclosed 
information in the notes to the consolidated financial statements under fair value 
measurement. Table 4.3 contains information on selection process. 
Table 4.3. Selection description 
Firm selection Nr. Firms 
Listed firms with biological assets 164 
Listed firms under historical cost valuation -30 
Firms without available annual report -2 
Total selection 132 
Data were collected in DataStream. Once more, countries were selected that adopted 
IFRS in the year before the analysed period, 2010, in this case. Then, considering 
corresponding selected countries, firms that have biological assets were selected. The 
criterion was to follow one of the biological assets variables (WS18277: biological 
assets – net book value, WS18278: biological assets – gross or WS18258: biological 
assets – current) and assuring that each firm has biological assets in the whole period 
between 2011 and 2013. Finally, thirty firms under historical cost valuation and two 
firms without an available annual report were removed. The total selection corresponds 
to 132 firms. Then and considering data from between 2011 and 2013, the study has 
estimated three equations using a panel least squares method that will be described in 
the next subsection. 
4.4.2. Research model 
In general, value relevance research examines the association between accounting 
amounts and equity market values. But there are also other related objectives. For 
                                                          22 There are seven missing firm-year observations, six observations regarding market value per share variable (the corresponding data are not available in DataStream) and one observation was removed from earnings per share variable because it was identified as an outlier (further explained in section 4.5.1). 
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example, for intangible assets, Dahmash et al. (2009) expect that value relevance 
research will assure valuable contribution to international accounting regulators, and in 
particular, to any further review of the accounting standards. 
According to Barth et al. (2001), to choose which methodology to adopt, in order to 
examine the value relevance, depends on the research question and corresponding 
hypotheses and also on econometric considerations. The price models – stock price 
regressed on earnings per share – analyse what is reflected in firm value and return 
models – returns regressed on scaled earnings variables – analyse what is reflected in 
changes in value over a specific period of time. Usually return models are preferred to 
price models, since former models have less econometric problems than second models 
(Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995). Therefore, researchers must have more caution in 
statistical inference when they use price models. In order to mitigate this effect it is 
possible to apply White's test of heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 
1980). Nonetheless, earnings response coefficients of price models are less biased than 
return models. In the overall, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) do not suggest following 
either price or return models exclusively. For example, Hamberg and Beisland (2014) 
adopt the return model and as complement the price model to examine whether firms, 
conducting goodwill balance reductions, experience negative stock returns and to 
analyse value relevance effects of book value of goodwill. 
The Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995) is an example of a price model. In general it 
represents firm value as a linear function of book value of equity and earnings per share. 
Regarding non-financial assets, such as goodwill, investment property and tangible and 
intangible assets, this approach was also followed by several studies (Baboukardos and 
Rimmel, 2014; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2010; Lourenço and 
Curto, 2008; Barth and Clinch, 1998). Additionally, and regarding the purpose of this 
research, Martins et al. (2012) have adopted this approach for biological assets domain, 
supporting that this model is effective in the ability to measure the sensitivity and the 
cause and effect between book value and market value of a given firm. Finally, the 
incorporation of disclosure in the value relevance of goodwill is also tested with this 
valuation model (Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2014; Al Jifri and Citron, 2009). As a 
consequence, to examine the value relevance of biological assets, this study adjusts the 
original accounting-based valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995).  
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In the overall, the Ohlson model is more explicit for this context, regarding the 
research questions introduced in this essay. Focus is on the financial statement amounts, 
in particular, biological assets. Consequently, and according to Barth and Clinch (1998), 
this model analyses market price as a summary measure of relevant information to 
investors and explore the ability of recognised financial statement amounts to explain 
this measure; in this case book value is split from biological assets effect. In what it 
refers to econometric concerns previously explained, it is considered White’s test 
(White, 1980).  
Return model could be used in a complementary research to investigate whether 
annual share returns are associated with current-year revaluations (Barth and Clinch, 
1998). In this sense it would be necessary to split firm earnings from unrealised 
valuation gains/losses of biological assets. This information was analysed in 
DataStream but there is a meaningful number of missing values considering the selected 
firms.  
Firstly, this study has submitted the dataset under a random effect model (Greene, 
2012). Then the Hausman test was applied, in which the null hypothesis supports that 
the coefficients estimated by the random effect estimator are the same as the ones 
estimated by the fixed effect estimator. The results infer that a fixed effect model is the 
appropriate model for this selection. By following the panel least squares method, three 
equations are considered for the adjusted Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995). To combine 
cross-sectional and time data enriches the research in the sense that it provides a higher 
amount of information and assures larger flexibility in modelling the individual 
heterogeneity (Green, 2012). Results are provided in table 4.6. In these regressions, the 
presence of heteroscedasticity is taken into account with White’s diagonal standard 
errors and covariance (White, 1980). Additionally, and in order to reduce 
heteroscedasticity, all variables (except control variables) are deflated by the number of 
common shares outstanding (Barth and Clinch, 2009). 
In brief, value relevance of recognised biological assets is tested in a regression 
where a firm’s market value is a function of the book value of equity and earnings. This 
relation is tested in the first equation with market value per share (MV) as dependent 
variable, and book value per share (BV) and earnings per share (E) as independent 
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variables. Moreover, this first model includes two control variables, namely, firm size 
(SIZE) and sector where it belongs (SECTOR).  
MVit= b0 +b1BVit +b2Eit+ b3SIZEit+ b4∑ j=1,2,3 SECTORjit +uit    (4.2) 
Then, in order to test the first hypothesis, in the second equation the variable book 
value per share (BV) is divided into two variables, book value per share excluding the 
biological assets per share (BV-BA), and biological assets per share (BA). Coefficient 
b2 assures the response to value relevance of biological assets under the fair valuation of 
IAS 41. 
MVit = b0 +b1(BV-BA) it +b2BAit+b3Eit+ b4SIZEit+ b5∑ j=1,2,3 SECTORjit +uit  (4.3) 
Finally, and with regard to the second hypothesis, the third equation adds the effect 
of disclosure. In this case, the goal is to investigate whether there is a systematic 
difference in biological assets valuation effects between firms with relatively high and 
relatively low disclosure level on biological assets. The coefficient b5 assures the 
response to value relevance of biological assets regarding mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. As previously explained, Dindex is a dummy variable based on whether 
disclosure index regarding the biological assets of each firm is below first quartile, in 
the middle of both quartiles, or above third quartile of selection’s disclosure index 
distribution. 
MVit = b0 +b1(BV-BA) it +b2BAit+b3Eit+ b4∑ j=1,2,3Dindexjit+ b5∑ j=1,2,3Dindexjit x BAit+ 
b6SIZEit+ b7∑ j=1,2,3 SECTORjit +uit        (4.4) 
Descriptive statistics, the correlation of the model’s variables and corresponding 
results of this research model are shown in next section. 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables. The market price per 
share (MV) for the selection ranges from a minimum of 0.01 € to a maximum of 126.53 
€. The average of book value per share (BV) is 6.59 € (median=1.59 €) and this variable 
lists a maximum of 148.13 €. There are four firms that exhibit a negative book value 
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(and as consequence, the book value per share (BV) is negative), two of them between 
2011 and 2013, another one in 2011 and the other in 2013. Corresponding data were not 
removed, given the fact that all these firms are still in activity, without any bankruptcy 
context. There are also other four firms that present a higher amount of biological assets 
when compared to book value. This finding justifies the negative minimum value in 
book value less biological assets per share (BV-BA). 
Biological assets per share (BA) stand in a wide range, between to close zero and 
56.68 €, and list an average value of 1.70 € (median=0.16 €). Given the fact that the 
annual report of each firm was analysed in order to calculate the disclosure index, the 
biological assets represented in the consolidated statement of financial position and in 
notes to the consolidated financial statements were compared to the information 
obtained through DataStream to additionally validate the data and, in certain cases, to 
reduce missing values of this variable. The analysis excludes any attempt to identify and 
remove outliers in the case of biological assets per share. Because this is the main 
variable to determine the number of selected firms, the decision is to maintain all firms 
with biological assets, regardless of its materiality. The earnings per share (E) stands 
between -13.08 € and 13.88 €, with a mean of 0.50 € (median= 0.06 €). One observation 
(-34.53 €) was removed from this variable because it was identified as an outlier. The 
firm size (SIZE) for the selection ranges from a minimum of 3.96 to a maximum of 
7.42, with a mean of 5.84 (median= 5.74). 
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics 
Selection:  1 389  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Observ. 
MV 7.62 1.41 126.53 0.01 16.19 4.24 389 BV 6.59 1.59 148.13 -0.47 15.68 5.88 389 BV-BA 4.89 1.23 92.10 -1.64 11.59 5.39 389 BA 1.70 0.16 56.68 0.0(1) 5.94 6.31 389 E 0.50 0.06 13.88 -13.08 1.86 2.58 389 SIZE 5.84 5.74 7.42 3.96 0.76 0.07 389 INDEX 60 60 100 13 18 -0.37 389 
            Frequency Percent 
SECTOR 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 46 34.85 
Manufacturing 63 47.73 
Others 23 17.42 
Dindex 
Below quartile 0.25 (50) 98 24.75 Between quartiles 0.25 (50) and 0.75 (74) 202 51.01 
Above quartile 0.75(74) 96 24.24 
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Regarding the dummy variables sector (SECTOR), 47.73% of the selected firms 
relate to manufacturing, 34.85% represent agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, and 
17.42% correspond to other sectors. The frequency of sector “Others” is presented in 
Appendix C. There is a wide range in disclosure index (INDEX) in the selection: the 
highest disclosure score obtained is 100 and the lowest is 13. The mean and the median 
of disclosure index are both 60. Also, 24.75% of the selection stands below first 
quartile, which corresponds to 50, and 24.24% stands above third quartile, which 
corresponds to 74. 
Appendix A summarises, by disclosure item, the number of firms that disclose 
biological assets information. In general, results corroborate the main findings of 
chapter 2. Most frequently reported items are: “A reconciliation of changes in the 
carrying amount of biological assets between the beginning and the end of the period” 
(n=368; [IAS 41.50]); “This reconciliation includes desegregation” (n=368; [IAS 
41.50]). This evidence is supported by Silva et al. (2012) for Brazilian firms. The least 
reported items are: “The aggregate gain or loss arising during the current period on 
initial recognition of agricultural produce” (n=9; [IAS 41.40]) and “The nature and 
extent of government grants recognised in the financial statements” (n=12; [IAS 
41.57]). Additionally, and taking into consideration the disclosures that exceed the 
mandatory and recommended items, it may suggest that there is an opportunity for 
improving biological assets disclosure, as concluded by PwC (2011) for the timber 
sector. In the absence of disclosure, Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) suggest that, given the 
support of auditors, enforcement bodies and other agents, firms should provide an 
explicit statement explaining when disclosure is not material or clarifying when 
disclosure is unreasonable on which standard items. Therefore, this would improve firm 
comparability and decrease information asymmetry and across firms. 
In addition, Appendix D exhibits the ranking of countries by the number of firms and 
their average disclosure level between 2011 and 2013. Once more, results show some 
discrepancy of information between firms and some lack of compliance regarding IAS 
41. In order to better understand this finding and assure further improvements, there is a 
recent report developed by Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) that discloses some 
recommendations for other non-financial assets. Based on a sample of 544 firms 
worldwide for the financial year 2010-2011, one goal of the study is to examine the 
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level of compliance with the mandated disclosures concerning mergers and acquisitions, 
intangibles and impairment assets. Overall, the report states that information between 
firms diverges considerably and that there is some level of non-compliance with regard 
to these three accounting issues. Firstly, the study advises to determine if firms 
deliberate certain transactions not to be material enough, if the standards are not clear 
enough, or if firms intentionally fail to follow the mandatory disclosure requirements. In 
this sense, preparers, regulators and enforcement bodies need to be focused towards 
improvement of the disclosure level by firms and to eliminate ambiguity in the 
interpretation of standards in order to assure greater comparability of the information 
provided by firms.  
Table 4.5 exhibits Pearson’s rank correlation coefficients. This set of correlations 
shows that all the independent variables are correlated positively with stock price. In 
particular, book value per share (BV) and book value per share excluding the biological 
assets per share (BV-BA) are highly positively correlated to the dependent variable. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, the correlation coefficient of biological assets per share 
(BA) with market price per share (MV) is a preliminary signal that biological assets are 
value relevant on a univariate basis. 
Table 4.5. Pearson’s correlation 
  MV BV BV-BA BA E SIZE 
MV 
      BV 0.887***      BV-BA 0.812*** 0.949***    
BA 0.757*** 0.789*** 0.554***    E 0.787*** 0.733*** 0.642*** 0.682***  SIZE 0.304*** 0.245*** 0.297*** 0.067*** 0.18***   
Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
In multivariate analysis, it is frequently accepted that correlations between 
independent variables are not risky unless they exceed 0.80 or 0.90 (Gujarati, 1995). 
The correlation coefficients are higher than 0.90 for the following variables, book value 
per share (BV) and book value per share excluding the biological assets per share (BV-
BA), but this has no effect on the analysis because both variables are not used in the 
same regressions. 
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4.5.2. Research model 
Table 4.6 shows estimated coefficients of the panel least square regressions for the 
three equations. In general, value relevance is tested in the first equation with book 
value per share (BV) and earnings per share (E). The coefficient of biological assets per 
share (BA) assures the response to value relevance in both second and third equations. 
Then, value relevance of biological assets regarding mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
is included in the third equation and it is measured by the coefficient of the crossed 
variable between the disclosure index ranking (Dindex) and biological assets per share 
(BA). Overall, the adjusted R-squared of the three equations are 0.835, 0.838 and 0.858, 
respectively. This indicates that introducing biological assets and the corresponding 
disclosure level separately improves, even slightly, explanatory power of the model.  
Regression coefficients for equation (4.2) are 0.668 and 2.608, respectively, for book 
value per share (BV) and earnings per share (E). Both variables are statistically and 
positively significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Therefore, this result infers that both 
variables are associated with firms’ market value. 
In order to test the first hypothesis, equation (4.3) excludes biological assets per 
share (BA) from book value per share (BV). The regression coefficients for equation 
(4.3) are 0.596, 0.881 and 2.406, respectively, for book value excluding biological 
assets per share (BV-BA), biological assets per share (BA) and earnings per share (E). 
The first and second variables are statistically and positively significant at 1% and the 
earnings per share at 5%. Hence, this evidence confirms the first hypothesis, which 
states that biological assets are value relevant at fair value under IAS 41. 
Regarding the second hypothesis, equation (4.4) tests whether there is a difference in 
the value relevance of biological assets between listed firms with high and low 
disclosure level on biological assets. This regression includes the interaction variable 
between the dummy variable related to the disclosure level (Dindex) and biological 
assets per share (BA). Regression coefficients for equation (4.4) are 0.668, 0.507, 2.432 
and 0.797, respectively, for book value excluding biological assets per share (BV-BA), 
biological assets per share (BA), earnings per share (E) and the interaction variable 
(Dindex3 x BA). These four variables are statistically and positively significant at 1%, 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. As a result, this evidence confirms the second 
 88 
 
hypothesis, which states that value relevance of biological assets is higher in listed firms 
with high disclosure level on biological assets. 
Table 4.6. Panel fixed effects regression model 
Equation: (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) 
Selection: 2011 2013 2011 2013 2011 2013 
Included panel observ: 389 389 389 
Dependent variable:  MV MV MV 
Variable coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
Constant -10.499 -3.567*** -11.774 -4.792*** -10.271 -3.952*** 
BV 0.668 5.597*** 
BV-BA 0.596 4.894*** 0.668 4.234*** 
BA 0.881 3.221*** 0.507 1.700*** 
E 2.608 2.415*** 2.406 2.266*** 2.432 2.567*** 
Dindex1 1.212 1.418*** Dindex3 -0.622 -1.232*** Dindex1 x BA 1.402 0.912*** Dindex3 x BA         0.797 3.088*** 
Controls 
SIZE  1.963 3.752*** 2.258 5.734*** 1.863 4.636*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 1.136 1.281*** 0.711 0.849*** 0.881 1.031*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.835 0.838 0.858 
F-statistic 327.428*** 287.464*** 213.358*** Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
In order to provide an additional analysis and given the classification under IAS 41, 
namely bearer and consumable biological assets, the selection was divided. Equation 
(4.4) is re-estimated using these two sub selections. Table 4.7 shows the corresponding 
results. 
The estimated coefficients of bearer biological assets sub selection are statistically 
similar to those of initial multivariate analysis. In the case of consumable biological 
assets, the interaction variable is not supported; it seems that investors do not value 
recognised biological assets in firms that exhibit a higher disclosure level. Usually there 
is an available market price for consumable biological assets and frequently they are 
sold in the short term. Therefore, the fair value of consumable biological assets is 
captured by the market faster when compared to bearer biological assets. Moreover, 
bearer biological assets are held for an extended period and typically it is more difficult 
to access the corresponding fair value. Consequently, in this case, mandatory disclosure 
or any further information is useful, and for that reason, investors value bearer 
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biological assets for firms that reveal a higher disclosure level on biological assets. 
Table 4.7. Bearer and consumable biological assets classification 
Panel A: Panel fixed effects regression results 
 Bearer  Consumable 
Variables coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
Constant -20.759 -3.957***  -3.394 -1.737*** 
BV-BA 0.549 3.345***  0.821 8.612*** 
BA 0.649 1.943***  1.148 3.247*** 
E 2.497 2.405***  1.781 1.752*** 
Dindex1 3.667 1.779***  -0.410 -1.101*** 
Dindex3 -0.912 -1.035***  -0.312 -0.549*** 
Dindex1 x BA 4.180 1.327***  -1.239 -1.376*** 
Dindex3 x BA 1.029 3.673***  0.040 0.117*** 
Controls      
SIZE  3.745 4.470***  0.689 2.001*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 1.295 0.893***  -0.012 -0.023*** 
N 167  222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.866  0.878 
F-statistic 98.907***  145.717*** 
Panel B: Chow test for equation (4.4) - all, bearer and consumable 
Sum squared residuals All Bearer Consumable 
 14077.14 9880.421 2285.219 
Number of parameters 10   
Number of observations 389 167 222 
F-statistic(10,369) 5.798   
Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
In order to reinforce the previous analysis, the Chow test was used to determine 
whether the coefficients can differ across subgroups (Chow, 1960). Due to the fact that 
F statistic is 5.798, which is superior to its critical value 2.369 at 1% level of 
significance, the study rejects the null hypothesis of structural stability. In such context, 
there is a structural change in this model, and it is necessary to split data into 2 sub 
selections meaning that independent variables have a different impact on both bearer 
biological assets and consumable biological assets subgroups of the whole selection. 
Based on this result, it is possible to infer that investors highly distinguish recognised 
biological assets under fair value between bearer biological assets and consumable 
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biological assets. This evidence supports, to some extent, the recent amendments to IAS 
41, which prescribe a different accounting treatment for bearer plants when compared to 
other biological assets. 
Finally and with the purpose of providing some robustness tests, two additional 
analyses were conducted. Firstly, table 4.8 reveals that the inferences of these equations 
are not sensitive to using prices as of three or six months after fiscal year-end, except in 
the third model. In this case, the interaction variable is not statistically significant when 
considering price as of six months after fiscal year-end. 
Table 4.8. Robustness test – market value six months after fiscal year-end 
Equation: (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) 
Selection: 2011 2013 2011 2013 2011 2013 
Included panel observ: 386 386 386 
Dependent variable:  MV6m MV6m MV6m Variable coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
Constant -11.251 -3.664*** -12.263 -4.806*** -11.848 -4.467*** 
BV 0.640 6.099*** 
BV-BA 0.584 4.962*** 0.616 4.125*** 
BA 0.809 3.410*** 0.623 1.947*** 
E 2.453 2.714*** 2.293 2.565*** 2.294 2.725*** 
Dindex1 1.401 1.632*** Dindex3 -0.341 -0.687*** Dindex1 x BA 0.385 0.271*** Dindex3 x BA         0.429 1.558*** 
Controls 
SIZE  2.069 3.815*** 2.303 5.570*** 2.127 5.226*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 1.153 1.299*** 0.821 0.946*** 0.960 1.067*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.837 0.839 0.845 
F-statistic 329.571*** 286.921*** 191.682*** MV6m – market value per share that equals the market price month close (6 months after the fiscal year) Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level  
Secondly, given the fact that biological assets per share represents a wide range of 
values, equations (4.3) and (4.4) were re-estimated, using a sub selection in which firms 
below first quartile in terms of biological assets per share in the selection are excluded. 
Table 4.9 shows that results are the same. 
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Table 4.9. Robustness test - Firms above first quartile of biological assets per share selection’s 
distribution 
Equation: (4.3) (4.4) 
Selection: 2011 2013 2011 2013 
Included panel observ: 289 289 
Dependent variable:  MV MV 
Variable coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
Constant -11.689 -3.565*** -9.566 -3.007*** 
BV-BA0.25 0.616 4.776*** 0.693 4.118*** BA0.25 0.964 3.641*** 0.590 1.902*** E 1.909 2.020*** 1.921 2.388*** 
Dindex1 0.837 0.683*** Dindex3 -0.853 -1.642*** Dindex1 x BA0.25 1.875 0.970*** Dindex3 x BA0.25     0.796 2.920*** 
Controls 
SIZE  2.268 4.701*** 1.806 3.890*** 
SECTOR1+SECTOR2=1 0.562 0.464*** 0.561 0.488*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844 0.865 
F-statistic 223.699*** 168.363*** BA0.25 – Biological assets (WS18277, WS18278 or WS18258) divided by common shares outstanding (WS05301) above first quartile of biological assets per share distribution. Statistical significance at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level;* 10% level   
4.6. Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research 
Taking into consideration previous studies, this study develops an extensive research 
based on a considerable number of countries with recent data concerning a standard that 
was recently under discussion.  
Value relevance research infers about how the accounting information is reflected in 
share prices and influences investors’ decision-making (Barth et al., 2001). Under the 
current adjustment in IAS 41, where firms will be permitted to choose either the cost 
model or the revaluation model for mature bearer plants according to IAS 16, for annual 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016, this essay examines market valuation 
implications of this standard. 
Based on 389 firm-year observations of listed firms worldwide in 27 countries that 
adopted IFRS until 2010, this study analyses data between 2011 and 2013 under the 
adjusted Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995). The empirical results support the two research 
hypotheses, namely, biological assets at fair value are value relevant under IAS 41 and 
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value relevance of biological assets is higher in listed firms with high disclosure level 
on biological assets. 
Firstly, there is evidence that the recognised amount of biological assets under fair 
value model is value relevant in general. Secondly, the recognised amount of biological 
assets under fair value model is more value relevant for firms that exhibit a higher 
disclosure level. According to biological assets classification under IAS 41, the 
selection was divided into bearer biological assets and consumable biological assets. 
Results are the same, with the exception of consumable biological assets. Where 
consumable biological assets are concerned, the interaction variable, which introduces 
the disclosure level effect in biological assets valuation, is not supported; therefore, it 
seems that investors value recognised consumable biological assets, but independently 
from the corresponding disclosure level. One possible explanation would be the fact that 
there is usually an available market price for consumable biological assets and that 
usually these biological assets are sold in the short term. Moreover, bearer biological 
assets are held for an extended period and typically it is more difficult to access the 
corresponding fair value. Consequently, any further information is useful, so investors 
value bearer biological assets for firms that show a higher disclosure level on biological 
assets. 
This essay has, however, some limitations. Firstly, in order to assure more robust 
results where panel data are concerned, the study could include data from a larger 
period of time. Using the period between 2011 and 2013 was the possible answer to 
obtain more recent data and to consider a more recent year of IFRS adoption. Secondly, 
with regard to the Ohlson model, there are alternative models to test this data, such as 
the return model. Additionally, this study has included size and sector as control 
variables. In this sense, further analyses could examine other firm characteristics. 
Regarding a more narrow scope, where disclosure index is concerned, and as clarified in 
chapter 2, there are no defined rules to deciding which paragraphs of IAS 41 should be 
grouped and which should represent one index item, as well as deciding if an item is 
applicable to a specific firm or not, so the information was treated according to the 
researchers’ best judgment. 
Further research could replicate this analysis to ascertain whether these results hold 
consistently across additional countries that adopted IFRS after 2010. It could also be 
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useful to investigate the extent to which market assessments of recognised versus 
disclosed biological assets amounts depend on the method of valuation (historical cost 
versus fair value). In a couple of years, considering the current discussion and 
subsequent amendments that are already settled in IAS 41, it could also be interesting to 
explore market valuation implications related to biological assets before and after 2016. 
Finally, this essay seeks to help standard setters to better understand the market 
valuation implications of this standard in order to improve the disclosure level by firms, 
to eliminate ambiguity in the interpretation of IAS 41 and to assure greater 
comparability of the information provided by firms. 
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This concluding chapter synthesises the main findings concerning the adopted 
research questions, acknowledges some limitations of the study, suggests avenues for 
future research and states main contributions. 
5.1. General conclusions 
IFRS have been recognised as a set of high-quality accounting standards (Amiraslani 
et al., 2013; Ball, 2006). Despite having already been adopted by almost 140 countries 
and other jurisdictions (IFRS Foundation, 2015), there are firm and country differences 
that explain the existing gap in the goal of standardization of those standards.  
One of the more debated issues of IFRS consists in fair value measurement. 
Accounting for biological assets has engaged increased attention from researchers since 
the implementation of IAS 41, mostly due to the radical change that is initially 
introduced concerning the measurement of those type of assets. In brief, biological 
assets should be measured at fair value less costs to sell. Only one exemption is allowed 
regarding initial recognition when the corresponding market price is not available and 
the entity cannot assure a reliable estimate of fair value. Recently, IASB has provided 
an amendment in IAS 41 according to which firms will be permitted to choose either the 
cost or the revaluation model for mature bearer plants under IAS 16 – Property, plant 
and equipment, for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016. 
Focusing on IAS 41, this dissertation aims to identify firm and country-level 
determinants that explain disclosure and measurement practices of biological assets, and 
also to examine the value relevance of fair value of these assets.  
The corresponding research questions related to firm and country-level determinants 
that explain mandatory and voluntary disclosure and measurement practices of 
biological assets under IAS 41 are described as follows: 
(i) What is the disclosure level on biological assets in listed firms under IAS 41?  
(ii) What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in the 
disclosure level on biological assets among listed firms? 
(iii) What firm and country-level determinants explain the differences in practices 
used to measure biological assets among listed firms? 
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In order to investigate market valuation implications of IAS 41, the following 
research questions related to value relevance of fair value of biological assets under this 
standard were considered in this research: 
(i) Are biological assets at fair value value relevant under IAS 41? 
(ii) Is there a difference in the value relevance of biological assets between listed 
firms with high and low disclosure level on biological assets? 
Concerning the theoretical background, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and signalling theory (Morris, 1987) are used to explain firm-level determinants of 
disclosure practices. In addition, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
accounting choice theory (Fields et al., 2001; Watts, 1992; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 
1981) are used to support firm-level determinants of measurement practices. Moreover, 
country-level determinants of disclosure and measurement practices are explored 
through contingency theory (Doupnik and Salter, 1995). Finally, value relevance of 
biological assets under IAS 41 is supported by the theory of asymmetric information 
(Glaum et al., 2013; Hitz, 2007; Healy and Papelu, 2001). 
Summarising the results of this investigation, with regards to the disclosure level by 
listed firms on biological assets under IAS 41 (chapter 2), evidence shows that the 
corresponding index stands in a wide range of values, although the majority of 
disclosure items are mandatory. Results indicate that 1) firms highly disclose the 
reconciliation of changes of biological assets between the beginning and the end of the 
period with desegregation and 2) tend to ignore the requirement of disclosing the range 
of estimates of fair value applied to biological assets measurement. 
With respect to mandatory and voluntary disclosure of biological assets, firm-level 
determinants, namely, biological assets intensity, firm size and to belong to agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors have a significant positive impact on mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure practices, which is supported by stakeholder, agency and signalling 
theories, respectively. Unexpectedly, ownership concentration also has a significant 
positive impact on mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices. Bearing in mind 
country-level determinants, two different country classifications were analysed, 
supported by contingency theory. Both the common law versus code law classification 
supported by La Porta et al. (1998) and a cluster classification that represents a more 
recent perspective introduced by Leuz (2010) are according to the theoretical 
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background. Firms that belong to common law countries or to outsider economies 
improve extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of biological assets. 
In this field, two main findings corroborate previous studies, namely: the need to 
improve the disclosure level and the dichotomy common law versus code law countries 
regarding this research topic.  
After analysing the disclosure level concerning biological assets and determinants 
influencing that type of disclosure (chapter 2), this study focused on measurement 
practices (chapter 3). 
As previously mentioned, IAS 41 requires biological assets to be measured at fair 
value less costs to sell. Ideally, firms that measure biological assets at historical cost 
should correspond to firms with no conditions to report biological assets at fair value. 
This dissertation concludes and also supports earlier studies that claim that there are 
other reasons related to firm and country environment that can explain the adoption of 
historical cost, even when the unreliability clause of fair value does not apply.  
With regard to firm-level determinants, biological assets intensity, firm size, to be 
listed in one or more than one foreign stock exchange, regulation expertise and to 
belong to agriculture or manufacturing sectors have a significant positive impact on 
probability of fair value measurement for biological assets, which is supported by 
agency and accounting choice theories. Regarding sector, individually, agriculture and 
manufacturing exhibit a different behaviour. Firms that belong to the agricultural sector 
are more likely to use fair value measurement model. Firms that belong to 
manufacturing sector tend to choose in a lesser extent fair value to measure biological 
assets. In particular, the beverages subsector corresponds to firms that have bearer 
biological assets, which are more difficult to measure given the absence of active 
markets, and consequently have a higher probability to avoid fair value measurement. 
Additionally, potential growth has a significant negative impact on fair value 
measurement practice. Furthermore, results do not corroborate theoretical background 
related to leverage.  
Secondly, results corroborate country-level hypothesis, bearing in mind contingency 
theory. Firms that belong to more developed countries, according to another country 
classification, such as the governance indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2011), are more 
likely to use fair value measurement model, avoiding use of the unreliability clause of 
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fair value. Finally, the study highlights positive and combined impact between 
regulation expertise and sector with fair value measurement for biological assets.  
The last part of this research consisted on testing the value relevance of measuring 
biological assets at fair value (chapter 4). 
The empirical evidence supports that biological assets measured at fair value model 
are value relevant in general. Additionally, recognised amount of biological assets under 
fair value model is more value relevant for firms that reveal a higher disclosure level. 
Following IAS 41 classification of biological assets, the selection of firms was divided 
into bearer biological assets and consumable biological assets. Results are similar only 
for bearer biological assets. Investors value recognised consumable biological assets, 
but independently from corresponding disclosure level. Regularly for consumable 
biological assets there is a quoted price in the market and usually they are sold in the 
short term. Consequently and when compared to bearer biological assets, fair value of 
consumable biological assets is faster apprehended by the market. In case of bearer 
biological assets, they are held for an extended period and frequently it is more difficult 
to access the corresponding fair value. Accordingly, in this case, mandatory disclosure 
or any additional information is helpful, and therefore the investors value bearer 
biological assets for firms that exhibit a higher disclosure level of these assets. 
5.2. Limitations 
As with all research, the studies comprised in this thesis are subject to limitations. 
Firstly, because there was only one researcher involved in this research, inter-coder 
reliability cannot be guaranteed concerning the construction of the disclosure index used 
to measure the disclosure level of biological assets. For example, there are no defined 
rules to deciding which paragraphs of IAS 41 should be grouped and which should 
represent one index item, as well as deciding if an item is applicable to a specific firm 
or not, so the information was treated according to the researchers’ best judgment. To 
minimise possible coding bias, the researcher coded the information twice and any 
discrepancies were solved. Secondly, this study focuses on the impact of specific firm 
determinants over disclosure and measurement practices, but there are maybe other 
relevant variables to consider, such as leverage, influencing disclosure practices or 
profitability and ownership concentration impacting measurement practices. 
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Additionally one cannot guarantee that results would hold when using different firm and 
country classifications that the ones applied in this study. Thirdly, taking into account 
value relevance of biological assets and in order to assure more robust results where 
panel data are concerned, the study could include data from a larger period of time. 
Regarding the Ohlson model, there are also alternative models to test this data, such as 
the return model.  
5.3. Suggestions for future research 
Several possible extensions of the empirical studies included in the dissertation are 
envisaged. Firstly and taking into account research of disclosure and measurement 
practices on causality explanation in specific segments – firm and country-level 
determinants, researchers must clarify the corresponding users of information that their 
study performs no extrapolations about other perspectives (Luft and Shields, 2014). 
Consequently, future research on this area could include other classifications regarding 
firms or countries. Additionally, other links could be explored, such as the relationship 
between measurement and disclosure practices in this domain. Furthermore, it could be 
analysed how the impact of environmental regulations at the country-level influences 
firms’ incentives to disclosure information and to adopt fair value with respect to IAS 
41. In regards to value relevance of biological assets, further research could replicate 
this analysis to ascertain whether results hold consistently across additional countries 
that adopted IFRS after 2010 and 2011. It could also be useful to investigate the extent 
to which market assessments of recognised versus disclosed biological assets amounts 
depend on the method of valuation (historical cost versus fair value).  
5.4. Main contributions 
In spite of the exposed constraints, this study provides important contributions to 
literature on biological assets under IAS 41. Compared to previous studies, this research 
analysed a wider selection of firms, ensuring that a larger number of countries and 
determinants related to disclosure and measurement are taken into consideration. 
Additionally, this thesis focused on recent data, which is particular relevant due to the 
recent review process of IAS 41.  
In general, this study contributes to extend the current knowledge of biological assets 
disclosure level, disclosure and measurement determinants and constraints. The firm-
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level determinants of disclosure practices are explained by agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and signalling theory (Morris, 1987). The firm-level determinants of 
measurement practices are supported by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and accounting choice theory (Fields et al., 2001; Watts, 1992; Zmijewski and 
Hagerman, 1981). Country-level determinants of disclosure and measurement practices 
are explored by contingency theory (Doupnik and Salter, 1995). Where disclosure is 
concerned, in addition to IAS 41, the research also included the best practices 
recommended by PwC in order to improve previous studies. Given the theory of 
asymmetric information (Glaum et al., 2013; Hitz, 2007; Healy and Papelu, 2001), a 
particular attention was given to market valuation implications of this standard in order 
to improve the disclosure level by firms, to eliminate ambiguity in the interpretation of 
IAS 41 and to assure greater comparability of information provided by firms. 
In particular, this study has contributed to support policy makers and international 
standard setters involved in future reviews of IAS 41. The empirical evidence provided 
in this thesis supports the recent amendments of IAS 41, in particular concerning the 
different models applied to consumable and bearer biological assets. As such, it is the 
researchers’ belief that further academic research or maybe further projects of IASB 
could be extended to other bearer biological assets, rather than plants, in order to apply 
or not the same amendments that are effective for annual periods beginning on after 1 
January 2016. 
Finally and given these amendments, since agricultural produce will still be measured 
at fair value, this change will not completely remove volatility in profit or loss. At a first 
moment, bearer plants are recognised at accumulated cost. The depreciation will begin, 
once the corresponding asset stands in location and is ready to work. “The point at 
which depreciation begins is subjective and is likely to depend on the type of plant. This 
judgment should be clearly disclosed” (PwC, 2015:6). Firms will need to separately 
control the biological assets under fair value from the bearer plants on which they grow, 
“which may increase the complexity and subjectivity of the measurement” (Ernst and 
Young, 2015:11). Consequently, in a couple of years, considering the current discussion 
and subsequent amendments that are already settled in IAS 41, it could be also 
interesting to explore market valuation implications related to biological assets before 
and after 2016.  
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Annex A. Leuz’s (2010) cluster classification 
Cluster 1   Cluster 2   Cluster 3   Australia  Singapore Austria Japan Argentina Pakistan Canada South Africa Belgium Korea (South) Brazil Philippines Hong Kong United Kingdom Chile Netherlands Colombia Portugal Ireland United States Denmark Norway Greece Taiwan Israel  Finland Spain India Thailand Malaysia  France Sweden Italy  New Zealand   Germany Switzerland Mexico   Cluster membership using regulatory and reporting practice variables 
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Appendix A. Disclosure index 
   Disclosure level  by item 
§ Score Disclosure index Chapter 2 270 firms 2011 
Chapter 4 132 firms 2011-2013   Mandatory items – the entity discloses   
40  The aggregate gain or loss arising during the current period:   
40 1 On initial recognition of biological assets 14 27 
40 1 On initial recognition of agricultural produce 5 9 
40 1 From the change in fair value less costs to sell of biological assets 201 348 
41 1 A description of each group of biological assets 230 345 
42 1 The description in [IAS 41.41] is narrative 174 281 
42 1 The description in [IAS 41.41] is quantified 204 287 
46 1 A description of the nature of an entity's activities involving each group of biological assets 123 207 
46  A description of non-financial measures or estimates of the physical quantities of:   
46 1 Each group of the entity’s biological assets at the end of the period 156 225 
46 1 Output of agricultural produce during the period 60 103 
47 1/(NA)a The methods and significant assumptions applied in determining the fair value of each group of agricultural produce at the point of harvest and each group of biological assets 
109 130 
48 1/(NA)a The fair value less costs to sell of agricultural produce harvested during the period, determined at the point of harvest 112 131 
49 1 The information about biological assets whose title is restricted or pledged as security 38 55 
49 1 The amount of commitments for developing or acquiring biological assets 24 42 
49 1 The financial risk management strategies related to agriculture activity 88 109 
50 1 A reconciliation of changes in the carrying amount of biological assets, between the beginning and the end of the period 248 368 
50 1 This reconciliation includes desegregation 242 368 
  Additional disclosures when the fair value cannot be measured reliably    
54  The entity measures biological assets at their cost less any accumulated depreciation and any accumulated impairment losses – the entity discloses    54 1 a A description of the biological assets 38 - 
54 1 a An explanation of why fair value cannot be measured reliably 49 - 
54 1 a The range of estimates within which fair value is highly likely to lie 2 - 
54 1 a The depreciation method used 26 - 
54 1 a The useful lives or the depreciation rates used 33 - 
54 1 a The gross carrying amount and the accumulated depreciation (aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the period 31 - 55 1 a The gain or loss recognised on disposal of biological assets 7 - 
55 1 a The impairment losses, in case of disposal 0 - 
55 1 a The reversals of impairment losses, in case of disposal 0 - 
55 1 a The depreciation, in case of disposal 12 - 
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56  The fair value of biological assets previously measured at cost less any accumulated depreciation and impairment losses becomes reliably measurable during the current period - the entity discloses  
 
56 1 a A description of the biological assets 0 - 
56 1 a An explanation of why fair value has become reliably measurable 0 - 
56 1 a The effect of the change 0 - 
57  Government grants – the entity discloses   
57 1 The government grants 26 36 
57 1 The nature and extent of government grants recognised in the financial statements 10 12 
57 1 Unfulfilled conditions and other contingencies attaching to government grants 1 0 
57 1 Significant decreases expected in the level of government grants 0 0 
  Non-mandatory but recommended items – the entity discloses   
43  A quantified description of each group of biological assets distinguishing between:   
43 1 Consumable and bearer biological assets 56 75 
43 1 Mature and immature biological assets 77 125 
51 1 The amount of change in fair value less costs to sell included in profit or loss due to physical changes and due to price changes 78 102 
51 1 This information is presented by the group of biological assets 33 42 
  Non-mandatory and non-recommended items – the entity discloses   
NA 1 The complexity of various parameters regarding the effect on the valuation (but there is limited information regarding the effect on the valuation) 124 238 
NA 1 The information on the effects of variations in key factors 53 103 
NA 1 The assumptions on future prices and costs, as well as disclosing a sensitivity analysis with multiple parameters 47 90 
 40 a    
a Regarding the chapter 4 the disclosure score is 27, once the disclosure items of IAS 41 that focus on the historical cost were omitted; in particular for 2013, the disclosure score is 27 or 25, depending on the adoption of IFRS 13 by the firms of the selection. 
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Appendix B. Ten firms with higher and lower disclosure level by country and sector 
Firm Country Sector Index Higher disclosure level Holmen            Sweden Manufacturing 1.00 Forestal Cholguan    Chile Manufacturing 0.95 Vipingo Plantations Kenya Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 0.95 Distell Group    South Africa Manufacturing 0.94 Vina San Pedro       Chile Manufacturing 0.94 R.E.A. Holdings PLC  United Kingdom Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 0.90 Select Harvests  Australia Manufacturing 0.89 York Timber          South Africa Manufacturing 0.89 Stolt Nielsen        United Kingdom Transportation and pub. utilities 0.89 Livestock Imp. Corporation     New Zealand Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 0.88 
    Lower disclosure level    Donegal Ireland Manufacturing 0.00 Kuwait Food Company  Kuwait Retail trade 0.00 L.D.C.            France Manufacturing 0.00 Randon          Brazil Manufacturing 0.00 Siguldas        Latvia Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 0.07 Unilever        Netherlands Manufacturing 0.09 Pernod Ricard     France Manufacturing 0.13 BTG PLC              United Kingdom Manufacturing 0.13 Vealls Limited       Australia Services 0.17 Carbon Conscious           Australia Transportation and pub. utilities 0.17 
Appendix C. Frequency of sector “Others” 
Sector (others) Disclosure Chapter 2 Total 
Measurement Chapter 3 Total 
Value Relevance Chapter 4 Total Construction 2 2 1 Transportation and pub. utilities 5 10 6 Wholesale trade 11 12 7 Retail trade 4 9 5 Finance, insurance and real estate 7 10 2 Services 5 7 2 
Total 34 50 23 
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Appendix D. Ranking of countries by the number of firms and their average disclosure level 
  Disclosure  Chapter 2  Value Relevance Chapter 4 
Country Number of firms 
Disclosure Index Number of firms 
Disclosure  Index 2011 2011 2012 2013 Chile 30 0.52 10 0.59 0.59 0.61 Brazil 28 0.59 15 0.61 0.63 0.62 Australia 25 0.63 16 0.59 0.61 0.61 Hong Kong  24 0.67 22 0.57 0.57 0.60 South Africa  20 0.49 15 0.57 0.58 0.59 United Kingdom  17 0.60 8 0.76 0.76 0.75 China  11 0.44 - - - - New Zealand  11 0.64 6 0.63 0.63 0.65 France  9 0.52 4 0.45 0.48 0.47 Norway  9 0.47 5 0.58 0.58 0.62 Philippines  8 0.49 3 0.64 0.64 0.67 Greece  7 0.63 3 0.52 0.52 0.58 Spain  7 0.39 3 0.42 0.42 0.45 Germany  6 0.67 1 0.78 0.78 0.81 Sweden  6 0.55 3 0.78 0.78 0.79 Finland  5 0.65 3 0.45 0.45 0.50 Luxembourg  4 0.44 - - - - Bermuda  3 0.50 - - - - Denmark  3 0.61 2 0.43 0.41 0.40 Ireland  3 0.65 2 0.43 0.43 0.45 Italy  3 0.60 1 0.44 0.44 0.43 Kenya  3 0.77 1 0.53 0.53 0.63 Netherlands  3 0.57 1 0.74 0.74 0.82 Portugal  3 0.59 2 0.50 0.50 0.50 Belgium  2 0.50 1 0.82 0.82 0.87 Lithuania  2 0.92 1 0.76 0.81 0.84 Peru  2 0.58 1 0.77 0.77 0.83 Ukraine  2 0.50 1 0.53 0.53 0.53 Cyprus  1 0.27 1 0.36 0.36 0.35 Oman  2 0.14 - - - - Russian Federation  2 0.44 - - - - Austria  1 0.38 - - - - Cayman islands  1 0.50 - - - - Croatia  1 0.47 - - - - Egypt  1 0.63 - - - - Faroe Islands  1 0.44 - - - - Kuwait  1 0.00 - - - - Latvia  1 0.07 - - - - Mauritius  1 0.76 - - - - United Arab Emirates  1 0.71 - - - - Papua New Guinea  - - 1 0.72 0.72 0.69 Total    270     132       
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Appendix E. Number of firms by country with the related measurement practice 
Nation Historical cost Fair value Total 
Australia 1 20 21 
Belgium -  2 2 
Brazil 7 22 29 
Canada -  6 6 
Cayman islands -  1 1 
Chile 11 15 26 
China 54 13 67 
Denmark -  3 3 
Finland -  4 4 
France 3 4 7 
Germany 1 3 4 
Greece -  7 7 
Hong Kong 1 25 26 
Ireland -  2 2 
Italy 2 -  2 
Kenya -  2 2 
Korea (South) 14 4 18 
Kuwait 1 -  1 
Lithuania -  1 1 
Luxembourg -  5 5 
Netherlands -  3 3 
New Zealand -  10 10 
Norway -  5 5 
Oman 1 1 2 
Peru -  2 2 
Philippines 4 5 9 
Poland -  1 1 
Portugal 1 2 3 
South Africa -  18 18 
Spain 3 4 7 
Sweden -  9 9 
United Arab Emirates -  2 2 
United Kingdom -  19 19 
Total 104 220 324 
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Appendix F. Chi-squared test between biological assets and measurement practice 
Consumable Bearer 
Count Crops Live Other consumable Sub total Dairy Vines Other bearer Sub total Total Historical cost 8 32 10 50 7 33 14 54 104 Fair value 57 45 19 121 10 54 35 99 220 Total 65 77 29 171 17 87 49 153 324 
 Likelihood Ratio Df Value Prob Measures of Association Phi Coefficient Cramer's V Contingency Coefficient 
All 5 19.145 0.002 All 0.230 0.230 0.225 Consumable 2 16.272 0.001 Consumable 0.297 0.297 0.284 Bearer 2 1.517 0.469 Bearer 0.099 0.099 0.098 
Appendix G. Expectation-prediction evaluation for binary specification 
Estimated equation Dep=0 Dep=1 Total P(Dep=1)<=C 75 22 97 P(Dep=1)>C 29 193 222 Total 104 215 319 Correct 75 193 268 % Correct 72.12 89.77 84.01 % Incorrect 27.88 10.23 15.99 
Appendix H. Goodness-of-fit evaluation for binary specification  
Statistic (3.1.) (3.2) 
Hosmer–Lemeshow 13.943 16.066 Prob.Chi-Sq (8) 0.083 0.041    Andrews  35.464 37.008 Prob.Chi-Sq (10) 0.000 0.000 
 
